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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
**NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**  
**SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION**

DELPHINE ALLEN, et al.

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF OAKLAND, et al.,

Defendant(s).

Case No. 00-cv-04599 WHO

**JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT  
STATEMENT**

Date: January 27, 2026  
Time: 3:00 p.m.  
Courtroom 2, 17th Floor  
Hon. William H. Orrick

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**PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT**

**I. PLAINTIFFS' CURRENT POSITION**

The Independent Monitor for the OPD has issued one NSA Sustainability Period Report (Eleventh Sustainability Report) since the last Case Management Conference statement. This Sustainability Period involves the monitoring of the “last remaining and most critical Negotiated Settlement Agreement Tasks: 2, 5, 20, 24, 25, 26, 30, 31, 34, 41, and 45.” (Dkt. 1525, p. 2)

As of the publication of the Eleventh NSA Sustainability Period Report of the IMT on November 18, 2025, OPD is in compliance with eight of these eleven Tasks:

1. Task 20 (Span of Control – in compliance when most recently assessed in the Third NSA Sustainability Period Report);
2. Task 24 (Use of Force Reporting Policy – in compliance per the Eighth NSA Sustainability Period Report and no longer subject to active monitoring pursuant to the Court’s 09/06/2024 Order regarding Internal Affairs Reporting)
3. Task 25 (Use of Force Investigations and Report Responsibility – in compliance per the Eighth NSA Sustainability Period Report and no longer subject to active monitoring pursuant to the Court’s 09/06/2024 Order regarding Internal Affairs Reporting);
4. Task 26 (Force Review Board (FRB) – in compliance when most recently assessed in the Third NSA Sustainability Period Report);
5. Task 30 (Executive Force Review Board (FRB) – in compliance when most recently assessed in the Third NSA Sustainability Period Report);
6. Task 31 (Officer-Involved Shooting Investigations Review Protocol – in compliance when most recently assessed in the Third NSA Sustainability Period Report);
7. Task 34 (Stop Data – in compliance when most recently assessed in the Third NSA Sustainability Period Report);

1 8. Task 41 (Use of Personnel Assessment System (PAS) and Risk  
2 Management – in compliance when most recently assessed in the Third NSA  
3 Sustainability Period Report)

4  
5 As of this writing, OPD is not in compliance with three NSA tasks:

6 1. Task 2 (Timeliness Standards and Compliance with IAD Investigations –  
7 not in compliance when most recently assessed during the Eleventh NSA  
8 Sustainability Period Report.),

9 2. Task 5 (Internal Affairs Division (IAD) Complaint Procedures – previously  
10 in compliance when assessed by the IMT in the 79<sup>th</sup> Report, “Deferred” in the  
11 First NSA Sustainability Period Report, then deemed “not in compliance”  
12 according to the Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth NSA Sustainability Period  
13 Reports before returning to compliance in the Sixth and Seventh IMT

14 Reports. Task 5 then reverted to not-in-compliance during the period covered  
15 by the 8<sup>th</sup> Sustainability Report, and has remained out of compliance through  
16 the periods covered by the 9<sup>th</sup>, 10<sup>th</sup>, and now 11<sup>th</sup> Sustainability Reports), and

17 3. Task 45 (Consistency of Discipline – this was in partial compliance during  
18 the First NSA Sustainability Period Report, then was moved to full

19 compliance during the period covered by Second NSA Sustainability Period  
20 Report. Between the Third Sustainability Report and the Ninth

21 Sustainability Report issued in December 2024, the IMT has reported “no  
22 compliance finding” for this Task. This was upgraded to “partial compliance”

23 in the 10<sup>th</sup> Sustainability Report issued in May 2025, and remained in

24 “partial compliance” when most recently reviewed in the 11<sup>th</sup> Sustainability  
25 Report)

26  
27 Plaintiffs’ attorneys concur with the IMT’s assessment that OPD is not  
28 currently in compliance with these three Tasks. The other eight Tasks that are

1 being monitored by the IMT -- or that are no longer subject to active monitoring  
2 pursuant to the Court's 09/06/2024 Order -- remain in compliance according to the  
3 IMT's 11<sup>th</sup> NSA Sustainability Period Report. Plaintiffs will therefore focus on  
4 Tasks 2, 5 and 45, which will determine whether and when OPD is able to finally  
5 achieve full compliance with the NSA in the Sustainability Period.

6 **II. TASK 2 (TIMELINESS STANDARDS AND COMPLIANCE WITH IAD**  
7 **INVESTIGATIONS)**

8 Task 2 requires that the Internal Affairs Division (IAD) of the OPD complete  
9 internal investigations in a timely manner. This task was inactive from 2015 to  
10 July 2019, before abruptly falling out of compliance in the 62<sup>nd</sup> IMT Report. Task 2  
11 was out of compliance until February 2022, when OPD once again met the  
12 mathematical threshold required for compliance. OPD remained in compliance  
13 with this Task through the 9<sup>th</sup> Sustainability Report, issued in December 2024.  
14 However, as of the most recent (10<sup>th</sup>) Sustainability Period Report, OPD has again  
15 fallen out of compliance with this Task.

16 OPD policy requires that "at least 85% of Class I misconduct investigations  
17 and at least 85% of Class II misconduct investigations must be completed within  
18 180 days to be considered timely." Per DGO M-03, Class I offenses "are the most  
19 serious allegations of misconduct and, if sustained, shall result in disciplinary  
20 action up to and including dismissal and may serve as the basis for criminal  
21 prosecution."

22 The IMT reviewed 53 Class I misconduct cases during the period covered by  
23 the Eleventh OPD Sustainability Report and determined that just 35 of these cases  
24 were completed in a timely manner. This represented an 64% timely-completion  
25 rate, which puts OPD below the 85% minimum threshold required for compliance  
26 with NSA Task 2.

27 The IMT had long warned that the timely-completion rate was been slipping  
28 downward over previous sustainability period reports, and that OPD's continued

1 compliance with this Task was therefore in serious jeopardy. As recently as  
2 December 2022 (during the period covered by the Second Compliance Report), OPD  
3 was completing 100% of Class I misconduct cases in a timely matter. (Second  
4 Sustainability Period Report, p. 3). During the period covered by the 5<sup>th</sup> through  
5 9<sup>th</sup> Sustainability Reports, the IMT determined that this number had dipped to 85-  
6 89% of Class I misconduct cases completed in a timely manner. In the period  
7 covered by the 10<sup>th</sup> Sustainability Period, the timely-completion rate for Class 1  
8 misconduct cases was 84%, below the mandated compliance threshold. It has now  
9 dropped a further 20%, and OPD is objectively nowhere near compliance with this  
10 Task.

11 The IMT also reviewed 146 Class II cases during the period covered by the  
12 11<sup>th</sup> Sustainability Report and found that 127 were in compliance with established  
13 timelines. This represents a 87% timely completion rate. Although this rate is just  
14 above the 85% minimum requirement, Plaintiffs' attorneys note that the completion  
15 rate for Class II cases was consistently higher in previous reporting periods,  
16 including at 91% in the period covered by the IMT's previous review and 98% in the  
17 preceding period. The downward trajectory does not bode well for maintaining the  
18 minimum timely completion rate in future reporting periods.

19 As noted, OPD was previously in compliance with this task for so long that it  
20 became inactive, before suddenly falling out of compliance. After reattaining  
21 compliance, OPD entered another cycle of slowly reducing timely-completion rates  
22 during the periods covered by Sustainability Reports 3-9. In spite of repeated  
23 warnings from the IMT and Plaintiffs' attorneys that OPD was at risk of falling to  
24 meet the 85% timely completion benchmark, the Department has continued to free  
25 fall.

26 OPD must retain compliance with Task 2 if the Department wishes to exit  
27 the Sustainability Period. Task 2 compliance is categorically different from the  
28 other Tasks that remain out of compliance insofar as the metric for compliance is



1 strictly mathematical: there is an objective target that OPD must meet, and has  
2 previously met.

3 Plaintiffs' attorneys have repeatedly noted that the mandated 85% timely-  
4 completion rate for OPD is substantially lower than what is required by most other  
5 consent decrees, so there is no reason OPD cannot meet this threshold.  
6 Furthermore, it should be noted that even if OPD meets this requirement, 15% of  
7 complainants are not receiving timely notice of investigation outcomes. The 64%  
8 timely completion rate for Class I cases during the most recent IMT review is  
9 wholly unacceptable and may be a basis for revoking the Sustainability Period.

### 10 **III. TASK 5 (COMPLAINT PROCEDURES FOR IAD)**

11 Task 5 pertains to Complaint Procedures for the Internal Affairs Division,  
12 and consists of several subtasks, all of which the IMT had previously found in  
13 compliance, including:

- 14 • Task 5.1, which requires that when a citizen wishes to file a complaint,  
15 the citizen is brought to a supervisor or IAD, or a supervisor is  
16 summoned to the scene.
- 17 • Task 5.2, which requires that if there is a delay of greater than three  
18 hours in supervisory response, the reason for the delay must be  
19 documented.
- 20 • Task 5.3, which requires that when a complainant refuses to travel to  
21 a supervisor, or wait for one, personnel make all reasonable attempts  
22 to obtain specific information to assist in investigating the complaint.
- 23 • Task 5.4, which requires that specific information be documented on a  
24 complaint form and submitted to the immediate supervisor or, in  
25 his/her absence, the appropriate Area Commander.
- 26 • Task 5.5, which requires that the supervisor or Area Commander  
27 notify Communications and forward any pertinent documents to IAD.

28 During the Sustainability Period the IMT focused on subtasks 5.15 to 5.19

1 and subtask 5.21, which address the quality of completed IAD investigations.

2 Prior to the onset of the Sustainability Period, the IMT determined that IAD  
3 investigations had improved to the standards mandated by the NSA; in February  
4 2022, OPD attained full compliance with Task 5. However, the First OPD  
5 Sustainability Report moved the status of Task 5 from “in compliance” to “deferred  
6 compliance”, and OPD was downgraded to “not in compliance” in the Second OPD  
7 Sustainability Report. OPD remained out of compliance with Task 5 over the next  
8 four reports as the Department, Plaintiffs’ attorneys, and the IMT crafted, refined,  
9 and implemented policies relevant to the Internal Affairs function following the  
10 publication of the “Conclusions and Recommendations Re: Vehicle Collision and  
11 Elevator Discharge Incidents” drafted by the independent law firm, Clarence Dyer,  
12 & Cohen LLP. (Dkt. 1564, “Clarence Dyer Report”)

13 During the period covered by the 7<sup>th</sup> Sustainability Report, OPD regained  
14 compliance with Task 5, and it appeared that the Department was making real  
15 strides toward sustainable compliance with this Task and, therefore, was meeting  
16 all requirements mandated by the NSA.

17 However, in the subsequent reporting period (covered by the Eighth  
18 Sustainability Report,) the IMT “learned of investigations conducted by both the  
19 Community Police Review Agency (CPRA) and an outside investigator into the  
20 actions of senior members of the Department with regard to an earlier IAD  
21 investigation. The outside and CPRA investigations resulted in sustained findings  
22 and discipline against several senior members of the Department – to include  
23 terminations, demotions, and suspension. (8<sup>th</sup> Sustainability Report, pp. 6-7). The  
24 IMT also noted that “these personnel findings and systemic deficiencies transcend  
25 the Department as a whole and call into question the capacity of the Department’s  
26 internal investigatory process. Based on these investigations, the serious  
27 deficiencies in the Department’s Internal Affairs Division render the Department  
28 out of compliance with Task 5.” (8<sup>th</sup> Sustainability Report, pp. 6-7). OPD was

1 accordingly found out of compliance with Task 5. OPD has remained out of  
2 compliance with this Task ever since.

3 According to the most recent IMT Sustainability Report, the “Internal Affairs  
4 Bureau [has] a number of issues, concerns, and developments which are not yet  
5 appropriate for public discussion. It is our hope that the City will expeditiously  
6 address these matters so that our confidence – and by extension, the community’s  
7 confidence – in the internal affairs process can be restored.” (Dkt. 1726, p. 9).

8 Although Plaintiffs’ attorneys cannot address the specific issues that the IMT  
9 categorized as “not yet appropriate for public discussion” (such as personnel issues),  
10 the IMT’s phrasing echoes concerns raised in previous Sustainability Period reports,  
11 including that the IMT “identified some concerns with the Internal Affairs Bureau’s  
12 (IAB) use of unfounded and exonerated findings” (10<sup>th</sup> Sustainability Report, p. 9),  
13 and that “the Department must rectify myriad issues pertaining to leadership,  
14 structure, and personnel management relevant to the Internal Affairs Bureau.” (9<sup>th</sup>  
15 Sustainability Period Report, p. 9). The emphasis on “leadership” and “personnel  
16 management” is revealing.

17 Plaintiffs’ attorneys can note that they have participated in extensive  
18 meetings with OPD personnel and the IMT regarding Departmental General Order  
19 M-04.1: Criminal Investigation of Department Members and Outside Sworn Law  
20 Enforcement Personnel, which is the policy pertaining to reporting allegations of  
21 criminal misconduct involving OPD personnel. These meetings have been  
22 productive, and plaintiffs’ attorneys affirmatively support revising policies and  
23 procedures to improve the Internal Affairs functions within the Department.

24 Separate and apart from that worthy goal, it is also important to memorialize  
25 that some issues within IA run deeper than specific policies. OPD has  
26 demonstrated time and time again that they are incapable of disciplining their own,  
27 especially at the supervisory level. As alluded to by the IMT excerpt above, some  
28 the Department’s IA-related shortcomings are more attributable to Departmental

1 leadership than existing rules and policies. This must be addressed by real, durable  
2 cultural change in tandem with policy adjustments. Put another way, these  
3 problems are downstream from leadership failures, not policy shortcomings.  
4 Former Chief Mitchell’s public complaints to the Police Commission about the  
5 “weaponization of the disciplinary process” (Exhibit 1, Who’s to blame for Oakland  
6 Police Chief Floyd Mitchell’s resignation, *Oaklandside*, October 10, 2025) within the  
7 Department are an illustrative example of culture-setting shortcomings. OPD’s  
8 broader failures in regarding fair and consistent discipline will also be elaborated in  
9 our review of Task 45, below.

10       Regarding Task 5, OPD’s inability to fully comply with both of the actively  
11 monitored Internal Affairs-related Tasks more than one year after the Court’s  
12 09/06/2024 Order restructuring the Internal Affairs Department is unacceptable  
13 and may also be a basis for revoking the Sustainability Period. These failures must  
14 be remedied before OPD can attain compliance with the NSA.

#### 15 **IV. TASK 45 (CONSISTENCY OF DISCIPLINE POLICY)**

16       Task 45 requires that discipline is imposed in a fair and consistent manner.  
17 OPD was in compliance with this NSA Task at the outset of the Sustainability  
18 Period. Following the publication of the Clarence Dyer Report, the IMT  
19 downgraded OPD’s compliance status with Task 45 to “no compliance finding”,  
20 citing “systemic and other deficiencies cited by the outside investigators were  
21 exacerbated by investigative and disciplinary decisions which were premised on the  
22 status and positional considerations of both violators and decision-makers” (Dkt.  
23 1577, Third Sustainability Period Report, p. 32). OPD remained out of compliance  
24 with Task 45 through the period covered by the 9<sup>th</sup> Sustainability Report, before  
25 achieving “partial compliance” in the 10<sup>th</sup> and now 11<sup>th</sup> Sustainability Period  
26 Reports.

27       Although the most recent IMT reports notes that “OPD continues to take  
28 steps to achieve compliance with this Task”, a recent OPD internal investigation

revealed wide disparities in how discipline is imposed within OPD. The Department's "2024 Internal Investigation Outcome and Discipline Report", published by the Office of Internal Accountability, is incorporated herein as Exhibit 2.

The Internal Investigation Outcome and Discipline Report investigated discipline outcomes across race, gender, and rank within OPD. The most notable finding was a massive discrepancy between the sustained rate for white sworn members and Black sworn members. Specifically, the investigation determined that there was a significant decrease in sustained findings among white OPD sworn personnel from 11% in 2023 to 2% in 2024:

**Table 1: Sustained Rates by Race 2023 Versus 2024<sup>3</sup>**

	2023			2024		
	% Sust	# Sust	Tot	% Sust	# Sust	Tot
<b>White</b>	<b>11%</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>348</b>	<b>2%</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>223</b>
<b>Black</b>	<b>6%</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>341</b>	<b>7%</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>351</b>
<b>Hispanic</b>	8%	40	512	<b>6%</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>425</b>
<b>Asian/Filipino</b>	7%	26	379	3%	11	342
<b>Other/Unknown</b>	9%	6	68	1%	1	76
<b>Total</b>	<b>8%</b>	<b>129</b>	<b>1648</b>	<b>5%</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>1417</b>

(2024 Internal Investigation Outcome and Discipline Report, p. 4).

Not only did white sworn members have a substantially lower sustained rate than Black and Hispanic officers, "further analysis showed that the 4 cases sustained against white sworn personnel involved only members over 40 and with 5 years of seniority. In other words, **the sustained rate for junior white officers (less than 5 years seniority or younger than 40) was 0%.**" (2024 Internal Investigation Outcome and Discipline Report, p. 4).

The authors of this report also compared the percentage of all allegations (sustained and not sustained/unfounded) to Department demographics to assess whether the differences in the percentage of cases aligned with the racial makeup of

OPD.

**Table 3: Demographic Breakdown of Department Personnel, Allegations, and Cases**

	Sworn Personnel in the Department*	Sworn Personnel Assigned to Patrol*	Allegations against Sworn Personnel	Cases involving a Sworn Member	Sworn Members with one or more cases**
<b>By Race</b>					
<b>White</b>	25% (169)	21% (81)	15% (312)	16% (223)	21% (95)
<b>Black</b>	22% (145)	24% (95)	25% (537)	25% (351)	22% (103)
<b>Hispanic</b>	29% (197)	28% (112)	31% (649)	30% (425)	30% (139)
<b>Asian/Filipino</b>	20% (138)	23% (89)	23% (494)	24% (342)	22% (103)
<b>Other/Unknown</b>	4% (27)	4% (17)	6% (117)	5% (76)	5% (21)
<b>By Gender</b>					
<b>Male</b>	86% (578)	86% (337)	84% (1778)	83% (1183)	85% (391)

11

<b>Female</b>	14% (98)	14% (57)	16% (331)	17% (234)	15% (70)
<b>By Rank</b>					
<b>Officer</b>	78% (527)	82% (323)	94% (1991)	94% (1331)	88% (406)
<b>Sgt or Above</b>	22% (149)	18% (71)	6% (118)	6% (86)	13% (58)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>676</b>	<b>394</b>	<b>2109</b>	<b>1417</b>	<b>461</b>

(2024 Internal Investigation Outcome and Discipline Report, pp. 11-12).

This revealed that white sworn personnel received a lower overall percentage of cases (16%) than their demographic slice of total OPD sworn personnel (25%). Conversely, “all other races received a higher percentage of cases than the Department representation.” (2024 Internal Investigation Outcome and Discipline Report, p. 12).

Further, while investigating whether members of a specific race had a disproportionate number of multiple discipline cases, the authors of this report determined that, in 2024, “white members were the least likely to have multiple

cases (57%) which was significantly lower than Black, Hispanic, and Asian members (74%, 71% and 79%).” (2024 Internal Investigation Outcome and Discipline Report, p. 13).

To determine whether there are differences in sustained rates for members based on the entity conducting the investigation, the authors of the 2024 Internal Investigation Outcome and Discipline Report also compared Division Level Investigations (DLIs) with Internal Affairs (IA) Investigations. The former are generally conducted by field sergeants and typically contain less serious allegations. IA investigations involve the most serious allegations and are conducted by supervisors assigned to IAB.” (2024 Internal Investigation Outcome and Discipline Report, p. 25). The results of this comparison are captured in the below chart:

**Table 20: Sustained Rate by Race 2024 (Full Investigations and Summary Findings)**

	All Investigations			DLIs and DLI Summary Findings			IA Investigations and IA Summary Findings		
	% Sust	# Sust	Tot	% Sust	# Sust	Tot	% Sust	# Sust	Tot
<b>White</b>	<b>2%</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>223</b>	<b>1%</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>203</b>	6%	1	18
<b>Black</b>	<b>7%</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>6%</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>326</b>	26%	5	19
<b>Hispanic</b>	<b>6%</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>425</b>	4%	17	387	29%	8	28
<b>Asian/Filipino</b>	3%	11	342	3%	10	317	7%	1	14
<b>Other/Unknown</b>	1%	1	76	1%	1	73	0%	0	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>5%</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>1417</b>	<b>4%</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>1306</b>	<b>19%</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>81</b>

(2024 Internal Investigation Outcome and Discipline Report, p. 25)

Black and Hispanic sworn members had the highest sustained rates for DLIs (6% and 4%, respectively), while the White sustained rate was just 1%. This racial disparity was even more pronounced for IA investigations, where Hispanic members were sustained at a 29% rate, Black members were sustained at a 26% rate, and white members were sustained just 6% of the time. White cases were far less likely to be sustained, regardless of the level of the discipline investigation.

Another hypothesis tested by the authors of the 2024 Internal Investigation



Outcome and Discipline Report was whether disparities in sustained rates by race differed depending on who initiated a case. To do so, they examined the sustained rate by race based on internal or external origin. The former are cases originally initiated by a member of the Department, while the latter are cases which were initiated by a member of the public or another organization/department. Table 23 on page 27 of the 2024 Internal Investigation Outcome and Discipline Report summarizes the findings of this investigation:

**Table 23: Sustained Rate by Race 2024**

	All Investigations			Internal Origin			External Origin		
	% Sust	# Sust	Tot	% Sust	# Sust	Tot	% Sust	# Sust	Tot
<b>White</b>	<b>2%</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>223</b>	0%	0	8	2%	4	215
<b>Black</b>	<b>7%</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>351</b>	47%	7	15	5%	16	336
<b>Hispanic</b>	<b>6%</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>425</b>	24%	4	17	5%	21	408
<b>Asian/Filipino</b>	3%	11	342	13%	1	8	3%	10	334
<b>Other/Unknown</b>	1%	1	76				1%	1	76
<b>Total</b>	<b>5%</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>1417</b>	<b>25%</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>4%</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>1369</b>

Even though internally-generated cases had a 25% sustained rate, **the sustained rate for white officers among internally generated cases was zero, compared to 47% for Black officers and 24% for Hispanic officers.** There was also a racial disparity in outcomes for externally-generated cases. The authors of the report concluded that “cases that start with an internal complaint deserve special attention to understand racial disparities”. (2024 Internal Investigation Outcome and Discipline Report, p. 27)

There were also clear disparities when internal cases were broken down by gender and rank. Tables 24 and 25 on page 28 of the 2024 Internal Investigation Outcome and Discipline Report shows the sustained rate by gender and rank, respectively:



**Table 24: Sustained Rate by Gender 2024**

	All Investigations			Internal Origin			External Origin		
	% Sust	# Sust	Tot	% Sust	# Sust	Tot	% Sust	# Sust	Tot
<b>Male</b>	5%	54	1183	21%	9	43	4%	45	1140
<b>Female</b>	4%	10	234	60%	3	5	3%	7	229
<b>Total</b>	<b>5%</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>1417</b>	<b>25%</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>4%</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>1369</b>

**Table 25: Sustained Rate by Rank 2024**

	All Investigations			Internal Origin			External Origin		
	% Sust	# Sust	Tot	% Sust	# Sust	Tot	% Sust	# Sust	Tot
Officer	4%	57	1331	30%	11	37	4%	46	1294
Sgt and Above	8%	7	86	9%	1	11	8%	6	75
<b>Total</b>	<b>5%</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>1417</b>	<b>25%</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>4%</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>1369</b>

Among internally-generated cases, female officers were sustained 60% of the time, while males were sustained one-third as often, just 21% of the time. Officers were also sustained three times as often within internally-generated cases (30%) when compared to supervisors with a Sergeant rank or higher, who were sustained in 9% of cases with an internal origin. These figures demonstrate wildly disparate discipline outcomes that are incongruous with the requirements of Task 45.

Following the publication of the 2024 Internal Investigation Outcome and Discipline Report, OPD issued a memorandum that “acknowledges that the disparities identified in the 2024 report, especially in internally generated cases and additional allegations discovered by the investigator, underscore the need for improved data integrity, consistent documentation, and ongoing oversight.” (Department Response to the 2024 IAM Outcome and Discipline Report, p. 2; incorporated as Exhibit 2-A to this Case Management Conference Statement.)

The Department subsequently asserts that “2024 represents an outlier rather than a trend”. This is belied by the fact that many of the disparities described in the 2024 Internal Investigation Outcome and Discipline Report were previously noted by the very same OPD Office of Internal Accountability just two years previously, in a report titled “*2022 Analyses of Race in Internal Investigations*

*Outcomes and Discipline: Supplemental Report Examining Failure to Accept or Refer Complaints*” (“OIA FTARC Report”).

This report determined that there were differences “in the discipline between white and Black officers for the allegation of a Manual of Rules Violation for Failure to Accept or Refer a Complaint (FTARC).” (OIA FTARC Report, p. 3 and is included as Exhibit 3 to the Case Management Conference Statement.

According to the 2022 OIA FTARC Report, there were 112 allegations for FTARC. The below table, incorporated on page 6 of the OIA FTARC Report, provided a breakdown of FTARC allegations compared to the demographics of OPD:

Breakdown of FTARC Allegations Compared to the Demographics of the Department

2022	% of Members in the Dept	% Allegations Received	% Sustained Allegations
Asian/Filipino	19%	16% (18)	18% (8)
Black	20%	18% (20)	27% (12)
Hispanic	28%	29% (32)	31% (14)
Other/Unknown	3%	4% (4)	12% (1)
White	29%	34% (38)	22% (10)
Total	100%	100% (112)	100% (45)

Another table, also on page 6 of the OIA FTARC Report, shows the sustained rate for FTARC allegations within OPD:

Sustained Rate of FTARC Allegations

2022	Sustained Rate
Asian/Filipino	44% (8/18)
Black	60% (12/20)
Hispanic	43% (14/32)
Other/Unknown	25% (1/4)
White	26% (10/38)
Total	40% (45/112)

The OIA FTARC Report itself noted that the wildly divergent sustained rates

for white sworn members (26%) and Black sworn members (60%) represent “a statistically significant difference.” (OIA FTARC Report, p. 6).

Allegation Findings by Rank and Race

Rank	Unfounded	Exonerated	Not Sustained	Sustained	Grand Total
<b>Lieutenant of Police</b>	<b>0%</b>	<b>0%</b>	<b>100% (1)</b>	<b>0%</b>	<b>100% (1)</b>
White	0%	0%	100% (1)	0%	100% (1)
<b>Sergeant of Police</b>	<b>47%</b>	<b>6% (1)</b>	<b>18% (3)</b>	<b>29%</b>	<b>100% (17)</b>
Black	0%	17% (1)	17% (1)	67% (4)	100% (6)
Hispanic	50% (1)	0%	0%	50% (1)	100% (2)
White	78% (7)	0%	22% (2)	0%	100% (9)
<b>Police Officer</b>	<b>29% (27)</b>	<b>1% (1)</b>	<b>28% (26)</b>	<b>43% (40)</b>	<b>100% (94)</b>
Asian	22% (4)	0%	33% (6)	44% (8)	100% (18)
Black	21% (3)	0%	21% (3)	57% (8)	100% (14)
Hispanic	33% (10)	0%	23% (7)	43% (13)	100% (30)
Other	50% (2)	0%	25% (1)	25% (1)	100% (4)
White	29% (8)	4% (1)	32% (9)	36% (10)	100% (28)
<b>Grand Total (Allegations)</b>	<b>31% (35)</b>	<b>2% (2)</b>	<b>27% (30)</b>	<b>(45)</b>	<b>100% (112)</b>

(OIA FTARC Report, p. 14)

A different graph in that report showed that officers accounted for 84% of FTARC allegations, while Sergeants accounted for just 15% and Lieutenants accounted for less than one percent. Officers were also sustained at a much higher rate (43%) than Sergeants (29%), while Lieutenants were not sustained at all.

Given that black officers were more likely to be sustained than their colleagues, and that officers were more likely to be sustained than command-level personnel, it follows black officers were sustained at the highest rates and white commanders were sustained at the lowest rates. Specifically, the Sustained rate for Black officers in the 2022 Report, was 57%, the highest of any officer race group. The Sustained rate for Black Sergeants was a whopping 67%, the highest of any Sergeant race group. And the Sustained rate for white Sergeants – **zero percent** – was the lowest for any Sergeant race group. (OIA FTARC Report, p. 14)

The findings in the more-recently-published “2024 Internal Investigation

1 Outcome and Discipline Report” are therefore not an outlier. To be clear: OPD’s  
2 Office of Internal Accountability should be applauded for this thorough  
3 investigation. The authors of this report were candid, meticulous, and specific  
4 about the obvious discrepancies that the data reveal. However, the Department  
5 cannot brush this aside as an “outlier” when similar criticisms about disparate  
6 discipline outcome were previously revealed by OPD Office of Internal  
7 Accountability.

8 This is recurring theme for OPD. The Hillard Heintze study at the outset of  
9 this decade determined that black sworn employees were more likely to have their  
10 allegations result in a sustained finding than other employees. Specifically, they  
11 found that “over the five-year time period, black employees were 37% more likely to  
12 have an allegation against them result in a sustained finding” and that “allegations  
13 that result in a sustained finding are more likely for black employees”. (Exhibit 4,  
14 Hillard Heintze Disparity Study, Report, p. 10.)

15 It appears that very little progress has been made in the intervening six  
16 years. The shortcomings laid out by OPD’s Office of Internal Accountability  
17 represent a violation of Task 45, which requires that discipline is imposed in a fair  
18 and consistent manner. OPD’s own Office of Internal Accountability indicates that  
19 the Department is well short of this goal, and the City’s October 2025 Status Report  
20 to this Court concedes that this investigation “revealed a racial disparity in internal  
21 investigations outcomes.” (Dkt. 1723, p. 9)

22 The Department continues to demonstrate that it cannot discipline its  
23 officers to the equitable standard mandated by the NSA, and Plaintiffs’ attorneys  
24 therefore agree with the IMT that OPD remains out of compliance with Task 45.  
25 Once again, this may be a basis for revoking the Sustainability Period.

## 26 **V. CONCLUSION**

27 Although the City of Oakland continues to claim that it is on the cusp of full  
28 compliance with the NSA, OPD remains out of compliance with Tasks 2, 5, and 45.

1 The Department has never been in compliance with all NSA Tasks in the  
2 Sustainability Period. The NSA cannot draw to a close while the Department  
3 remains out of full compliance with these tasks, which are foundational to the NSA.  
4 Indeed, OPD remains in breach of the terms of the Sustainability Period, as it has  
5 been since the outset of the sustainability period.

6 Plaintiffs' attorneys had a recent meeting with Deputy Chief Aaron Smith,  
7 Captain Hubbard Chief Bere, and attorney Brigid Martin over the disparity issue  
8 discussed extensively in our statement. We believe these people recognized the  
9 problem we were describing and, unlike Chief Mitchell, have the will and the  
10 potential to improve this situation. We would like to see the sustainability period  
11 end soon and the NSA to finally end. Whether it does or not will be decided in our  
12 minds by sustained progress OPD makes on these issues.

13 We cannot help but believe that the way African American Officers are  
14 treated within OPD is reflected in the way African American citizens are treated by  
15 the OPD in Oakland. This was the cause of the Riders case 25 years ago when  
16 Officer Vasquez (who fled the country and is still at large) planted drugs on over  
17 100 citizens (all but one of whom was African American). These victims went to  
18 prison and served an aggregate of dozens of years for crimes they did not do.

19 OPD has changed for the better since that time. Yet the core problem  
20 reflected by OPD's failure to comply with Tasks 5 and 45 still remains. We need to  
21 see more progress on these Tasks before we agree to end the Sustainability period.

22 ///

## THE CITY'S STATEMENT

### OVERVIEW

Plaintiffs' counsel John Burris's law partner Ben Nisenbaum lauded the Oakland Police Department last month, recognizing the Department as a "constitutional policing model." In a media event to announce a settlement agreement with the Antioch Police Department, Burris's partner talked about their involvement in both the Oakland and Antioch lawsuits and compared the recent Antioch settlement to the Negotiated Settlement Agreement (NSA) in this case, stating, "[a]nd of course, that was a case that transformed the Oakland Police Department into a constitutional policing model." Fernandez, Lisa, *Antioch, Civil Rights Attorney John Burris Reach Constitutional Policing Settlement*, KTVU Fox 2, (Dec. 19, 2025, 12:44 PM), <https://www.ktvu.com/news/antioch-civil-rights-attorney-john-burris-reach-settlement-over-45-officers> (last visited Jan. 14, 2026). The City agrees. The Department is a model of constitutional policing. Its transformation is evident even to those who may have at one time been among its staunchest critics. The Department has state-of-the-art policies designed to improve public safety outcomes for all. By and large, Department personnel comply with its policies and are held accountable when they fall short. The Department has reduced racial disparities in its police stops over the last decade and sustained the vast margin of that decrease for the last several years. Finally, our officers prioritize community care and trust as part of their crime prevention and public safety strategy, proactively investing in the community in countless ways every day. The City appreciates Mr. Nisenbaum's recognition of the Department and its members' outstanding achievement. It is due to the accomplishments of the Department's members that the City expects to soon be in a position to demonstrate to the Court and community that the Department is prepared to continue its transformation absent further Court oversight.

On December 6, 2025, Mayor Lee tapped former Assistant Chief James Beere

1 to serve as Interim Police Chief. Chief Beere has been a sworn member of the  
 2 Department for 27 years. His exemplary service has earned him some of the  
 3 Department's highest honors, including the Blue Star Medal for outstanding  
 4 command and control during a mass casualty incident and the Medal of Merit for  
 5 superior tactics and de-escalation in a life-threatening situation. Chief Beere is also  
 6 a decorated combat veteran, serving with distinction as a Command Sergeant Major  
 7 in the United States Marine Corps. Originally from San Francisco, he has proudly  
 8 called Oakland home for nearly three decades. Chief Beere promoted Casey Johnson  
 9 to Interim Assistant Chief, and Deputy Chief Aaron Smith to lead the IAB. Despite  
 10 recent changes in personnel, Department leadership has kept the NSA task  
 11 responsibility list up to date so that the Department's ongoing internal task  
 12 compliance inspections, supervised by Bureau of Risk Management (BRM) Chief  
 13 Deputy Chief Lisa Ausmus, continue without interruption. The most recent NSA  
 14 Task Responsibility list is attached as Exhibit 5.

15 **I. The City's Sustained Compliance with the Terms of the NSA is a**  
 16 **Meaningful Measure of its Readiness to Exit Court Oversight.**

17 In the City's estimation, NSA task compliance remains an important proxy  
 18 for the City's readiness to exit Court oversight. The parties fashioned the terms of  
 19 the NSA so that when those terms were satisfied, the parties would have a measure  
 20 of confidence in the City's ability to continue to self-sustain compliance following the  
 21 end of Court oversight. It is largely a credit to the Department's perseverance and  
 22 commitment to its constitutional policing model that the City can report today that  
 23 as of the last quarter of 2025, it may be in compliance with all technical  
 24 requirements of the three remaining NSA tasks.

25 **A. The City Has Improved its Timely Completion of Internal**  
 26 **Investigation Cases (Task 2).**

27 The City's preliminary analysis of internal affairs data for the fourth quarter  
 28 of 2025 shows that it likely met the Task 2 threshold requirement that it complete  
 at least 85% of Class I and 85% of Class II internal investigations within 180 days.



1 Because these results are preliminary and we have not discussed this analysis with  
2 the monitor, we are remaining cautiously optimistic. In any event, it is fair to say  
3 that IAB has drastically improved their case closure timelines, and the completion  
4 rate is likely between 83% and 91% for Class I investigations, and above 90% for  
5 Class II investigations.

6 Achieving and sustaining compliance, or near-compliance, through the first  
7 half of 2026 will be a good indicator that the City can sustain long-term compliance  
8 with Task 2. The City asks the Court also consider that prior to the City's recent  
9 period of non-compliance, it had sustained compliance with Task 2 for three  
10 consecutive years. IAB's biggest obstacle continues to be personnel resources and, as  
11 a result, investigators carry exceptionally heavy caseloads. While seven complex  
12 Class I investigations is considered a heavy caseload, each IAB investigators now  
13 routinely carries a caseload closer to 15 cases. The City explained in its October  
14 Status Report that due to lack of overall personnel, it simply does not have enough  
15 sworn officers to promote additional officers to sergeant to work as IAB  
16 investigators. Dkt. 1723, *Defendant's Status Report* 6 (October 21, 2025). IAB  
17 continues to endeavor to make the most of available strategies to improve efficiency.  
18 It is also currently working on a plan for officers to assist investigating sergeants  
19 with discrete tasks, though the Department's shortage of sworn officers makes even  
20 this a challenge. On January 16, 2026, the Department graduated its first academy  
21 since 2024. The 14 officers will now start a 16-week Field Training program. It is  
22 unlikely, however, that this addition to the Department's ranks will have an  
23 immediate impact on IAB's staffing.

24 The Police Commission's investigative entity, the CPRA, has continued to  
25 increase its staff. The Police Commission recently announced that CPRA's acting  
26 director, Antonio Lawson, will serve as the agency's permanent Executive Director.  
27 Hiring a permanent CPRA director fulfills the recommended next step by  
28 consultants advising on the City's long-term plan of moving IAB investigations to



CPRA.<sup>1</sup> Since October, CPRA has also hired a second Complaint Investigator III (highest level), and an additional Complaint Investigator II, and elevated two temporary Complaint Investigator IIs to permanent status. A new Project Manager is scheduled to start work on February 2, 2026. CPRA is also in the process of contracting with outside counsel to advise on complex investigations, assist with drafting CPRA policies and procedures, and train CPRA employees.

The City is continuing to make slow but steady progress toward its long-term plan to transferring IAB to CPRA, and is working diligently to ensure that in the interim, IAB meets its Task 2 timelines. The Police Commission's work to support CPRA is further discussed in the Commission's Statement to the Court, attached as Exhibit 6.

**B. The City Continues to Comply with All Internal Affairs Complaint Procedures Subtasks (Task 5).**

The City contends that it is in compliance with Task 5. There have been eleven compliance periods assessed since the Court-ordered Sustainability Period began in 2022. During these eleven periods, the monitor has never assessed the Department out of compliance on Task 5 due to deficiencies on any of the enumerated subtasks. In most reports, the monitor has had no disagreements with internal investigations, credibility findings, or dispositions in cases it reviewed. The monitor has consistently stated that the Department is in compliance on all subtasks. According to the three most recent reports issued by the monitor between December 2024 and November 2025, the Department continued its lengthy history of sustained compliance with all assessed technical requirements of Task 5. Dkt. 1726, *Eleventh NSA Sustainability Period Report of the Independent Monitor 5* (Nov. 18, 2025); Dkt. 1698, *Tenth Sustainability Period Report 7-9* (June 3, 2025);

<sup>1</sup>In its June 2025 report, *Examining the Transfer of Oakland Police Department Internal Affairs Investigations to the Civilian-Staffed Community Police Review Agency*, the City's consultant recommended as next steps in the process of transferring IAB to CPRA that the City should (1) hire a new permanent CPRA executive director, and (2) create a working group of stakeholders "to assess next steps and course correct on issues that arise." *Id.* at 20.

1 Dkt. 1683, *Ninth Sustainability Period Report* 6-8 (Dec. 20, 2024).

2 Furthermore, with the Police Commission’s January 2026 approval of the  
3 Department’s revision of DGO M-04.1, *Criminal Investigation of Department*  
4 *Members and Outside Sworn Law Enforcement Personnel*, the Department has  
5 completed all of the recommendations from its self-initiated lessons-learned report  
6 to address the investigatory failures in the Tran case, with the exception of the  
7 recommendation to impact positive culture change—that will remain an ongoing,  
8 continuous endeavor.

9 While the Department’s investigatory failures in the Chung and Tran  
10 investigations provided a reasonable basis to extend Court oversight  
11 notwithstanding technical task compliance, three years have elapsed since the Tran  
12 case, and there have been no further similar failures to faithfully apply policy.  
13 There have been no indications of the “cultural rot” that in the past compelled the  
14 Court to continue oversight. *See* Dkt. 1673, Sept. 4, 2024 Court Tr. 13:15-16 (Court  
15 finding “It’s this area [ ] that compels continued court oversight, which is well  
16 overdue to be terminated.”) For these reasons, the City contends that it is in  
17 compliance with Task 5.

18 **C. The City Continues to Meet the Compliance Standard for Task 45**  
19 **by Proactively Identifying and Addressing Racial Disparity in**  
20 **2024 Investigation Outcomes.**

21 Although the monitor assessed the City in partial compliance with Task 45,  
22 Consistency of Discipline Policy, the City continues to contend that it has been in  
23 substantial compliance with Task 45 since at least 2024. Dkt. 1622, *Joint Case*  
24 *Mgmt. Statement* 21-25 (Jan. 19, 2024); Dkt. 1660, *Joint Case Mgmt. Statement* 47  
25 (Aug. 28, 2024); Dkt. 1701 *Joint Case Mgmt. Statement* 30-35 (Jul. 3, 2025).  
26 Regardless of any lack of consensus about technical NSA task compliance, however,  
27 fairness and consistency of discipline remains a priority for the City. The City and  
28 the Department recognize that consistency in discipline is a critical part of the  
City’s constitutional policing model. The Department has been analyzing its

1 internal investigation case outcomes and discipline since 2020 to identify and  
 2 ameliorate discipline disparity. Department policy requires an annual inspection of  
 3 outcome and discipline data to identify and address disparity based on race, gender,  
 4 and rank. *See DGO R-01, Risk Management* (published Apr. 2022). The Department  
 5 uses a detailed methodology to conduct the annual data analysis. The methodology  
 6 was developed with the assistance of the monitoring team and Stanford researchers.  
 7 The methodology is a “working” methodology, which means the Department  
 8 updates the methodology after each annual data analysis because every analysis  
 9 reveals areas for optimization and by updating the process and integrating lessons  
 10 learned, future analyses are more robust and reliable.

11 **1. The Department is Working to Address Racial Disparity**  
 12 **Identified in 2024 Internal Investigation Sustained Rates.**

13 At the end of October 2025, the Department’s Office of Internal  
 14 Accountability (OIA) finalized its 2024 Internal Investigation Outcome and  
 15 Discipline Report. Ex. 2. Consistent with past practice, the OIA received assistance  
 16 from a Stanford researcher in its analysis. The OIA presented its findings at the  
 17 November 2025 monitor’s site visit. On December 7, 2025, Chief Mitchell published  
 18 the Department’s response to address the OIA’s findings and recommendations. Ex.  
 19 2-A.

20 The OIA made the following concerning findings about 2024 internal  
 21 investigations outcomes:

- 22 • In 2024, Black (7%) and Latinx (6%) officers were sustained at a significantly  
 23 higher rate than white officers (2%);
- 24 • There were only four cases where white sworn members were sustained;
- 25 • The racial disparity was more pronounced across sustained rates for  
 26 internally-generated cases and internally-discovered violations—Black (47%),  
 27 Latinx (24%), white (0%);

- There was observable gender and rank disparity across sustained rates for internally-generated cases—female (60%), male (21%); officers (30%), sergeants and above (9%).
- The number of sustained sworn member cases fell by 50% (129 to 64); and
- The overall sworn sustained rate dropped from 8% in 2023 to 5% in 2024.

While the Department still has some concern about the overall reduction in the number sustained cases and the reduction in the sustained case rate for officers, its concern is somewhat tempered by the OIA's determination that the "change in processing of [Failure to Accept or Refer a Complaint] (FTARC) allegations explains roughly half of this 50% drop." Ex. 2, *OPD OIA 2024 Internal Investigation Outcome and Discipline Report 4* (Oct. 2025). The Department recently changed policy to allow some FTARC allegations to be handled by non-disciplinary means (i.e., Summary Note Files entry), where there is no pattern of conduct. Because FTARC allegations are a frequently occurring allegation and have a high sustained rate, it makes sense that removing many of these allegations from the data would result in a significant reduction in the number of sustained cases and, therefore, the sustained rate.

**2. OIA Did Not Find Any Explanation for the Disparity, Though it Did Find that the Disparity was More Pronounced for Allegations that Originated in the Department.**

The OIA inspected the data to determine whether the disparity correlated with particular investigators (it did not), depended on how serious the misconduct was (no), depended on the age or tenure of the officer investigated (no), whether it was investigated by IAB or DLI sergeants (no), and whether certain types of allegations tended to result more often in disparity (no).<sup>2</sup> The only meaningful correlation it uncovered was with case generation: the racial disparity in sustained rates was more pronounced in internally-generated cases.

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<sup>2</sup> For example, there was no disparity observed in the sustained rate for FTARC cases.

1 A case is categorized as internally generated if it is initiated by Department  
2 employees (e.g., complaint of misconduct made by a supervisor, or co-worker, or self-  
3 reported by an officer), as opposed to externally generated cases which are initiated  
4 by someone who does not work for the Department, typically a member of the  
5 public. Making things a bit more complicated, cases that are externally generated  
6 may nonetheless have allegations discovered by case investigators during the  
7 investigation. When allegations are added after the initial case generation, the  
8 additional allegations are referred to as self-discovered or internally discovered  
9 allegations. Adding internally discovered allegations does not change the case  
10 generation category from external to internal, even if only the internally discovered  
11 allegations are sustained. Because internally discovered allegations share the same  
12 origin as internally generated cases, the OIA also analyzed internally discovered  
13 allegations. Racial disparity was even more pronounced in sustained rates for  
14 internally discovered allegations. While analyzing internally generated cases, the  
15 OIA also observed a notable difference in gender and rank sustained rates that was  
16 not present in the overall data. OIA did not observe disparities in rank or gender  
17 sustained rates for internally discovered allegations.

18 Even when it looked more closely at the internally generated cases, however,  
19 OIA was unable to find an explanation for the disparity. Importantly, the disparity  
20 did not appear to be the result of Black or Latinx officers receiving more allegations  
21 per case. There is a 2% chance of an officer getting a sustained finding in a case  
22 with one allegation. The odds increase to 9% in cases with more than one allegation.  
23 *Id.* at 14. Therefore, if officers of a particular race tend to more often have multiple  
24 allegations in a single case, that could explain the disparity at the case level. The  
25 percentage of officers with only one allegation per case, however, stayed consistent  
26 across race. *Id.* at 22.

27 The OIA also evaluated whether the number of cases per officer differed  
28 based on an officer's race. Overall, white officers were the least likely to have

multiple cases (57%), which was significantly lower than Black, Latinx and Asian members (74%, 71%, and 79%, respectively). Of the 461 officers who had at least one case in 2024, 104 officers had five or more cases (32 Latinx, 29 Asian, 26 Black, 12 white, and 5 other/unknown). Only 13% of white officers who had at least one case had 5 or more cases, compared to between 23% and 28% for all other races. This multiple-case statistic does not impact the sustained-rate-per-case statistic or explain the disparity in sustained rates. It does, however, explain the higher frequency with which officers of color are involved in the overall number of cases annually, suggesting a disparity in exposure or case volume rather than differential sustained rates per case. This does not necessarily mean that officers with multiple cases are engaging in misconduct more often, but rather that they may be assigned to or work in situations that involve greater risk or more frequently result in a higher volume of complaints. OIA did not, however, find that particular assignment explained the 2024 disparity. *Id.* 11-13.

The OIA also considered whether white officers had their cases resolved more frequently by less formal processes. The data does not suggest that non-white officers are more frequently subjected to harsher discipline process, or that white officers are afforded more opportunities to take advantage of less formal or more lenient processes. The percentage of cases proceeding to full investigations rather than completed through the less formal processes of Summary Findings or Informal Complaint Resolution were consistent across race. This makes it likely that the disparities arise within fully investigated cases or, in other words, that disparities start appearing only after a case is assigned to a full investigation. *Id.* at 35.

**3. Without An Explanation for the Disparity, and With Evidence of Substantial Data Fluctuation in the Past Several Years, the City is Not Provided With Meaningful Answers About What the Disparity Means and How to Effectively Address the Disparity.**

While the 2024 analysis could not provide an explanation for the disparity, it was able to provide the Department with important information and

1 recommendations to allow the Department to gather additional information that  
2 may improve its chances of obtaining an explanation for observed disparity in  
3 future data analyses.

4 The OIA's 2024 analysis showed that a point in the discipline process worth  
5 further investigation is the point at which misconduct cases or allegations are  
6 generated by Department employees. It is true that these findings bear some  
7 similarity to the Department's 2022 finding of racial disparity in sustained rates for  
8 FTARC allegations because FTARC allegations are frequently internally discovered.  
9 However, it is also important to note that there are distinct differences. First, the  
10 2022 disparity was not statistically significant. Second, FTARC violations are just  
11 one type of misconduct—there have not been disparities found in any other specific  
12 type of misconduct allegation. Rather, the disparity was found in overall sustained  
13 rates, and in cases and allegations of internal origin, generally. Third, disparity was  
14 not noted in the sustained rate for FTARC allegations in 2024.

15 It is also important to note that in response to the observed disparity in the  
16 sustained rate for FTARC allegations, the Department made policy changes to  
17 reduce discretion and improve consistent application of adding *any* internally  
18 discovered allegations—not just FTARC allegations—by requiring notification to  
19 the IAB Commander within 24 hours when an allegation was added to a case  
20 (Training Bulletin V-T.1, *Internal Investigation Procedure Manual*, revised  
21 November 2023). Unfortunately, what OIA discovered in its 2024 analysis is that  
22 the Department's data collection must be improved before it can analyze the impact  
23 of the 2023 policy intervention. While we do not observe the same disparity in  
24 FTARC sustained rates, the 2024 data gives us concern, generally, about allegations  
25 of internal origin.

26 Additionally, as we drill down to look more closely at the data, it is important  
27 to remember to drill up as well, and not to lose sight of the big picture and what  
28 that tells us about trends in data beyond the 2024 data. As previously reported,



looking back five years, the data does not reflect that the disparity in the 2024 outcomes is part of a trend or pattern. *See Fig. 5*. Between 2020 and 2024, officers across all races had similar five-year average sustained rates, with white officers having the highest sustained rate. *Id.* When numbers fluctuate year-to-year but maintain a stable five-year average, it suggests that the fluctuations are not indicative of a long-term trend but rather variations around a stable baseline. Thus, while the data fluctuation between 2023 and 2024 was more extreme, fluctuations in the opposite direction in recent years result in a relatively consistent average across all races over a five-year period, with all races averaging between a sustained rate between 6% and a 9% over that period. This indicates that the variation observed in 2024 is not part of an ingrained trend of disparate treatment or a demonstration of cumulative disparate impact. In the monitor's November 2025 assessment, the monitor agreed it was relevant to consider the varying sustained rates in recent years in the consideration of the 2024 sustained rates and observed racial disparity. Dkt. 1726, *Eleventh NSA Sustainability Period Report of the Independent Monitor* 10 (Nov. 18, 2025) ("However, these figures have fluctuated over the last few years.")

**SUSTAINED CASES BY SUBJECT OFFICER RACE  
FIVE-YEAR AVERAGE**

	2020-2024 Combined		
	Total Cases	Sustained	Percent Sustained
White	1691	147	9%
Black	1298	102	8%
Latinx	2050	162	8%
Asian	1426	87	6%
Other	290	24	8%
Total	6755	522	8%

*Fig. 5*



1                   **4. The Department's Response to Address Disparity is**  
2                   **Thoughtful, Informed, and Future-Looking.**

3                   We must remember that the reason we study past data and learn as much as  
4 we can about observed disparities is to reduce the likelihood of future disparity and  
5 improve the consistency of internal investigation outcomes and discipline. We have  
6 conducted the most thorough analysis possible on the 2024 data using the  
7 Department's robust methodology. It is now 2026. It does not make sense for the  
8 Department to continue to investigate the 2024 data and cases when the 2025 data  
9 will soon be available. The Department should take what it learned from the 2024  
10 study and apply its knowledge and new information to its investigation of the 2025  
11 data.

12                  With that in mind, the Department's response to the 2024 study and  
13 proposed interventions are reasonably targeted to address the disparity based on  
14 the OIA's findings. We do not know why the disparity occurred but we are  
15 concerned that it appeared to correlate with cases where misconduct is reported by  
16 Department employees rather than members of the public. The Department agreed  
17 to keep these concerning findings in the 2024 data at top of mind when it analyzes  
18 the 2025 data, and as it reviews the 2026 quarterly data. The Department is also  
19 revising its methodology to ensure case origin is consistently analyzed as part of its  
20 mandatory annual study. It is working to improve its data collection—increasing  
21 the data collected about the misconduct allegations and cases that originate  
22 internally and intervening to improve consistent data entry by members. The OIA's  
23 recommendations are focused on how to make future data analyses more  
24 meaningful. Targeting disparity can occur in two ways: interventions designed to  
25 impact specific processes and outcomes using methods reasonably designed to  
26 mitigate the disparity, or across the board training or other interventions to reduce  
27 implicit bias and systemic issues that may be causing or supporting disparity. The  
28 2024 data does not provide enough information to give the City a reasonable basis

1 to believe that a targeted intervention would achieve results. The Department's  
2 response to address disparity also included additional measures aimed to impact  
3 systemic and implicit biases. Ex. 2-A. When statistically significant racial  
4 disparities exist without a clear race-neutral explanation, research and  
5 organizational best practices suggest that the disparity may be driven by systemic  
6 or implicit bias. Therefore, it is appropriate that the Department included implicit  
7 bias training and advanced race and equity courses, in addition to embedding such  
8 instruction within the Department's Continuing Professional Training and the  
9 Chief's Command Retreats, in order to improve discipline consistency.

10 The City and the Department will continue to work together to ameliorate  
11 disparity and improve discipline consistency. The Department has already begun  
12 working to complete the measures recommended in the OIA's report. In addition,  
13 Chief Beere and DC Smith are drafting an addendum to the Department's response  
14 to ensure that the current agency administration's response aligns with the vision  
15 of the Chief and the IAB DC. In the coming months, the Department will also (1)  
16 review the preliminary 2025 outcome data to determine whether the disparity in  
17 sustained rates is part of a continuing trend; (2) publish the results of its 2025  
18 survey on members' perceptions about consistency and fairness in internal  
19 investigation and discipline the Department; and (3) conduct qualitative interviews  
20 to obtain both a deeper and broader understanding of members' perceptions.

21 Plaintiffs argue that the City is not doing enough or not doing the right  
22 things to address disparity in internal investigation outcomes and discipline. The  
23 Department can and is addressing disparity through Department-wide intervention  
24 aimed at systemic and implicit bias. A more targeted intervention or change to a  
25 particular policy or practice, however, must be thoughtful and informed. The OIA  
26 study did not provide the City with enough information to give it reason to believe  
27 that any particular targeted intervention would impact the disparity in sustained  
28 rates. The City is open to considering plaintiffs' ideas for a targeted intervention; to

1 date, they have not suggested any targeted interventions. Based on the information  
 2 the City has, it is not reasonable to decide that the City's response to this issue—  
 3 either in response to the 2024 study or over all—is or has been anything other than  
 4 informed, thoughtful, and thorough. The City is doing all that it can to intelligently  
 5 and comprehensively address disparity in investigation and discipline.

6 As plaintiffs note, the Department was in compliance with Task 45 in 2022  
 7 and its compliance status was only “downgraded” following the publication of the  
 8 outside investigator's report on the elevator discharge and hit and run  
 9 investigations (Chung cases). Pl. Br. at 7. This recognition is important because it  
 10 affirms that *the 2022 change in compliance status was not based on the*  
 11 *Department's ongoing efforts to use data and survey feedback to help it mitigate*  
 12 *discipline disparity*. Therefore, it would be a significant change in compliance  
 13 standard and, therefore, unreasonable, to now hold the Department out of  
 14 compliance on Task 45 based solely on the 2024 data and the Department's  
 15 response to address disparity in the data. Moreover, is inconceivable that the City is  
 16 performing worse with respect to Task 45 now than it was in 2022, in light of the  
 17 fact that, as discussed above, it has not experienced failures similar to the Chung or  
 18 Tran cases since 2023, and it has undertaken further measures to prevent similar  
 19 failures.

20 **II. The City's Proposed Transition Plan Will Prevent Progress from**  
 21 **Stalling Following Court Oversight by Empowering Local Ownership**  
 22 **of its Constitutional Policing Model.**

23 This City's local-ownership initiative aims to transition the City,  
 24 Department, and the community from a mindset of court-ordered compliance to one  
 25 of institutional pride in Oakland's Constitutional Policing Model. In Mayor Lee's  
 first appearance before the Court in July 2025, she stated:

26 Under my leadership, the City will focus not only on NSA compliance  
 27 but what comes after compliance, after Court oversight ends. We will  
 28 remain attentive to the long term and the perpetual task of  
 maintaining a culture in the Police Department that mirrors the  
 culture of the community that it serves and that brings the

1 Department into the fold. It takes leadership, it takes focus, and it  
2 takes commitment.

3 Jul. 10, 2025 Tr. 47. Consistent with Mayor Lee's July 2025 statement, the  
4 City will not ask the Court to terminate oversight until the City positions itself for  
5 continued, long-term success. Success in this context is not merely sustaining  
6 technical, static compliance with the NSA indefinitely following the end of Court  
7 oversight. Success is continuing our forward momentum and cultural  
8 transformation of the Department. The City's goal is to put itself in a position where  
9 the Department has forward momentum and its vision, energy, and resources are  
10 focused on striving for even greater excellence in constitutional policing. Cultivating  
11 a sense of ownership as publicly and clearly as possible will put the City and the  
12 Department in the best possible position to successfully continue the Department's  
13 cultural transformation after Court oversight ends.

14 **A. The City's Executive Leadership Will Promote Cultural  
15 Alignment.**

16 City leadership agrees wholeheartedly with the Court's admonition that  
17 executive leadership must drive culture; culture cannot drive the leadership. The  
18 City's transition plan operationalizes that philosophy. Mayor Lee, City  
19 Administrator Johnson, and Chief Beere will jointly champion a clear message:  
20 constitutional policing makes police more effective and improves public safety  
21 outcomes. The City's constitutional policing model embodies the 51 NSA tasks and  
22 reflects the City's and the community's values.

23 The City and the Department have taken significant and definitive action, or  
24 modeling, to achieve compliance with the NSA, which is strong evidence that  
25 leadership and Department members appreciate the NSA's value, and recognize  
26 that it is the foundation of the City's constitutional policing model. Effective agency  
27 leaders, however, use messaging as well as modeling to ensure transparency about  
28 an agency's goals and its leader's commitment. Modeling without messaging, or  
messaging without modeling, can create misalignment. A leader must communicate

1 their ultimate goals and the values that inspire those goals; and a leader's actions  
 2 should validate their articulated vision. The City and the Department must be vocal  
 3 about the value of the NSA and our constitutional policing model, and vocal about  
 4 their rejection of the false narrative that the Department only complies with NSA  
 5 tasks because it is required by an external mandate.

6 **B. The Department Instituted a Constitutional Policing Unit to**  
 7 **Support Continued Improvement of the Department's Excellence**  
 8 **in Constitutional Policing.**

9 Assistant City Administrator Michelle Phillips will immediately serve as the  
 10 interim Constitutional Policing Administrator. The City plans to hire a Department  
 11 employee to permanently serve this role. The Constitutional Policing Unit will  
 12 assist Mayor Lee and Chief Beere in promoting local ownership and moving beyond  
 13 the historical association of the NSA and compliance with external oversight. The  
 14 NSA tasks will be reframed as integral components of Oakland's constitutional  
 15 policing model. This shift in terminology de-emphasizes compliance-driven  
 16 mandates and instead uplifts the practices begun under the NSA as an essential  
 17 part of the Department's core mission.

18 **C. The City Will Engage with Experts to Help Communicate the**  
 19 **City's Message About the Value of its Constitutional Policing**  
 20 **Model.**

21 The City intends to engage with national and local experts, outside of the  
 22 monitoring team, to discuss with Department members, City employees, and the  
 23 community the value of constitutional policing and how the tenets of the NSA  
 24 support our constitutional policing model, and to help elevate the City's messaging  
 25 about how our constitutional policing model improves public safety outcomes. While  
 26 we recognize the monitoring team as national experts in constitutional policing and  
 27 appreciate their ongoing assistance, hearing from a variety of independent experts  
 28 will help build consensus on data and outcomes, and reinforce the inherent value of  
 these practices to Department members, City employees, and the community.

///

1  
2 **D. The City Will Share Examples of Improved Public Safety**  
3 **Outcomes.**

4 By proactively sharing data and anecdotes that demonstrate how the City's  
5 constitutional policing model improves public safety outcomes, the City build trust  
6 between the community and the Department, and encourages a value-driven view of  
7 the NSA and our constitutional policing model. This strategy aims to provide a  
8 direct link between constitutional policing and the City's public safety goals,  
9 providing tangible evidence that these practices are not burdensome and  
10 unnecessary extra work, but essential public safety agency functions. As part of the  
11 transition plan, the City and Department will work to correct the misconception  
12 that constitutional policing is an obstacle to, rather than a component of, public  
13 safety.

14 **E. The City Recognizes that its Constitutional Policing Model is**  
15 **Dynamic.**

16 It is important to recognize and communicate that the City created the  
17 framework of the NSA, but the Department, Police Commission, and community  
18 have all contributed to building and honing the details of our constitutional policing  
19 model. The City expects that the Department and Commission will not hesitate to  
20 make improvements to our constitutional policing model as appropriate where  
21 operational observations and evidence demonstrate that policy and practice must be  
22 amended. It is vital that our community, which includes Department members,  
23 understands that there are ways to effect change when appropriate, either to end  
ineffectual practices or to make effective practices even better.

24 **F. The City is Dedicated to Strengthening Relationships to Improve**  
25 **Trust.**

26 A core principle of sustained reform is trust—the public's trust in the  
27 Department, the Police Commission, and City leadership, and trust between and  
28 among the Department, the Police Commission, and City leadership.

1 Mayor Lee continues to actively engage with members at all levels of the  
2 Department. In late November 2025, she attended a listening session with the  
3 Criminal Investigation Division and participated in the Chief's quarterly command  
4 retreat. Mayor Lee's engagement fosters internal trust, ensures both City and  
5 Department leaders are fully informed, and rejects the notion of the Department  
6 carrying out its public safety mission in isolation. Rather, it positions Mayor Lee as  
7 an informed policing partner. As one example of her ongoing work, tomorrow,  
8 January 21, 2026, Mayor Lee will hold a press conference to announce details of the  
9 City's partnership with Merritt College to help the City grow and support the  
10 Department.

11 Interim Chief Beere began leading the Department five weeks ago, but his  
12 consistent personal engagement with the community he lives in and serves long  
13 pre-dates his tenure as Oakland's top cop. Chief Beere's participation in numerous  
14 events in December and January—including faith community mixers, youth  
15 violence prevention collaborations, and the Asian Police Officers' Association  
16 dinner—demonstrates a broad, inclusive approach to community relations. His  
17 efforts extend to the most vulnerable populations, hosting lunch at the Police  
18 Administration Building for local students from several local high schools and  
19 attending Ceasefire violence prevention night walks, connecting with residents in  
20 underserved and under-resourced neighborhoods in East, West, and North Oakland.  
21 Chief Beere's commitment and engagement is consistently recognized as  
22 exceptional—last month he received a 2025 Appreciation Award from Bay Area  
23 United, a local organization with deep roots in the West Oakland Yemeni and  
24 immigrant community that provides inclusive and accessible youth soccer  
25 programs, mentorship, and community-building initiatives, for his dedicated  
26 leadership and support of at-risk youth—a testament to the positive impact of these  
27 trust-building endeavors and Chief Beere's longstanding commitment to Oakland's  
28 communities.



1 The success of the Department's trust-building efforts have garnered recent  
2 attention in the national media. The "OPD Gives Back Holiday event," in December  
3 2025, where officers shared dinner with and gave toys to 100 Oakland Unified  
4 School District students, showcased positive interactions between law enforcement  
5 and youth. Lee, Amber, *Oakland Police Host Holiday Celebration for 100 Kids to*  
6 *Connect in a Positive Way*, KTVU Fox 2, (Dec. 18, 2025, 5:39 AM),  
7 [https://www.ktvu.com/news/oakland-police-host-holiday-celebration-100-kids-build-](https://www.ktvu.com/news/oakland-police-host-holiday-celebration-100-kids-build-relationships)  
8 [relationships](https://www.ktvu.com/news/oakland-police-host-holiday-celebration-100-kids-build-relationships) (last visited Jan. 20, 2026). A similar toy giveaway in East Oakland in  
9 early January co-hosted by law enforcement and attended by Police Commission  
10 Chair Garcia-Acosta, deepened community relations within the Latinx/immigrant  
11 community. Additionally, on October 23, 2025, Chair Garcia-Acosta facilitated a  
12 listening session for family members who lost loved ones to homicides in Oakland.  
13 During the event, sponsored by local community-based violence prevention,  
14 intervention, and healing non-profit Youth ALIVE!, family members shared  
15 testimonials about their experiences dealing with Department members and  
16 officers, including the Department's victim service liaisons.

17 These interactions work in concert to transform the police-civilian dynamic  
18 from one of tension to one of shared responsibility, creating a safer and more  
19 cohesive environment for all residents, bridging historical divides through shared  
20 experience.

## 21 CONCLUSION

22 The reality is that there will never be a police department anywhere in the  
23 world under a consent decree or court oversight that can guarantee that at the end  
24 of oversight it will forever be a model police department. All signs, however, point to  
25 the Department being on the best possible path. Empirical evidence from  
26 jurisdictions exiting federal oversight suggests that the danger of backsliding  
27 increases when reform remains compliance-driven rather than value-driven. Reform  
28 that is perceived as merely burdensome, rather than a catalyst for improved public



1 safety outcomes, is less likely to be self-sustaining. The City's transition plan  
2 mitigates the likelihood of regression and resistance and improves the likelihood  
3 that the City's constitutional model will be self-sustaining.

4 Based on the Department's already substantial accomplishments, the City  
5 expects that the Department will emerge even stronger and more resolute in its  
6 accountability culture following the conclusion of Court oversight. An end to Court  
7 oversight is a tangible reward that acknowledges the value of the work of not only  
8 the Department's current personnel, but all of its members over the past 20 years  
9 who have worked tirelessly to make the Department a model of constitutional  
10 policing and earn the badge of honor that ending Court oversight will provide. We  
11 look forward to the Court's feedback on the City's transition plan.

12 ///

**THE OPOA’S STATEMENT**

Intervenor Oakland Police Officers Association (“OPOA”) is confident that the Oakland Police Department (“OPD”) has made great strides toward full compliance. Moreover, OPOA has complete confidence that Chief Beere is fully capable of leading the Department into the next phase of these proceedings. The OPOA remains committed to work collaboratively with all parties to reach full compliance with the NSA.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: January 20, 2026      RYAN RICHARDSON, City Attorney  
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\*Per Local Rule 5-1(i)(3), the filer attests that concurrence in the filing of the document has been obtained from each of the other Signatories