

Building Political Power through Policy Reform in Oakland

A policy analysis conducted for the
American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California

in collaboration with Bay Rising, California Common
Cause, Every Voice, and MapLight



Source: AP Photo/Kevork Djansezian

Brooke Barron, MPP
August 2018

Acknowledgements

My sincere gratitude to the following people, whose support, expertise, and generosity were instrumental in the completion of this report.

Whitney Barazoto
Oakland Public Ethics Commission

Dan Lindheim
Former Oakland City Administrator

Annie Campbell Washington
Oakland City Councilmember

Abdi Soltani
American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California

Anthony Corrado
Campaign Finance Institute

Hamsini Sridharan
MapLight

Tam Doan
Every Voice

Jonathan Stein
Oakland Public Ethics Commission

John Jones
Communities United for Restorative Youth Justice

Sarah Swanbeck
Berkeley Institute for the Future of Young Americans, UC Berkeley

Teddy Kỳ-Nam Miller
Greenlining Institute

Janet Torres
D-Lab, UC Berkeley

Kimi Lee
Bay Rising

An especially heartfelt thanks to Dr. Héctor Cárdenas and Raúl Macías for their ongoing guidance, thoughtful feedback, and enthusiastic support throughout the process.

Table of Contents

Executive Summary | **4**

Oakland's Legacy of Race-Based Inequalities | **5**

Objectives of this Report | **7**

Why does Political Inequality Matter? | **9**

Policy Proposals to Tackle Political Inequality | **13**

Policy Options

- o Public Financing: Multiple Matching Funds in New York City and Los Angeles | **15**
- o Public Financing: Democracy Vouchers in Seattle | **20**
- o Lowering Campaign Contribution Limits | **24**

Recognizing the Ways Oakland is Unique – and Not So Unique | **26**

Projected Impacts and Trade-offs | **28**

Recommendations | **30**

Conclusion | **33**

Appendix A: Methodology and Limitations | **34**

Appendix B: Cost Estimates | **40**

Appendix C: Other Alternatives Considered | **41**

Endnotes | **43**

Executive Summary

A black baby born today in East Oakland has a life expectancy 14 years less than that of a white baby born in the Oakland Hills. That East Oakland baby is twice as likely to be underweight at birth; as a child, she is three times less likely to read at grade level and twenty-one times more likely to live in poverty; and as an adult, she is six times more likely to be unemployed and two-and-a-half times more likely to die of a stroke.¹ She is also far less likely than her white counterparts in the Hills to register to vote, turn out to vote, and donate to candidates in local elections.

In the face of worse health outcomes, higher unemployment rates, and shorter life expectancies, why should we care about differences in voting and donation rates? Oakland's persistent educational, environmental, health, and economic disparities have their roots in policy decisions made at the local level, and in order to address these inequities, people have to engage in politics. When people participate in the political process through voting and donating to political campaigns, they gain access to and influence over policymakers. Policy change requires political engagement.

This report focuses on the relationship between political engagement and policy outcomes by investigating policies that increase voting and donation rates among traditionally marginalized communities. Through qualitative and quantitative analyses of policies in other cities, I explore local strategies that harness the power of money in politics, particularly through public financing of campaigns.

By changing incentives for candidates and elected officials, resetting cycles of engagement, and amplifying the dollars – and the voices – of people traditionally excluded from the political process, public financing programs appear to be effective at increasing voting and donation rates from low-income communities and people of color.

This analysis shows how a public financing program intentionally designed with community input and supported by evidence of what works in other cities could boost political participation and build political power among Oakland's communities of color. Greater political participation leads to greater influence over policy, making increased political participation an essential step towards advancing racial and economic equity in Oakland.

Oakland's Legacy of Race-Based Inequalities

Oakland, California prides itself on being one of the most diverse cities in the nation. The destination for tens of thousands of African Americans fleeing the Jim Crow South during the Great Migration and the birthplace of the Black Panthers, a landing point for Vietnamese and Laotian refugees, and home of majority Spanish-speaking neighborhoods Fruitvale and Jintown, Oakland has a vibrant legacy of diversity and inclusion. Oakland's government also has a history of enacting policies that disproportionately harm people based on race and income level. This legacy continues to have dire repercussions for Oakland's communities of color.

Decades of redlining, a practice where the federal government-sponsored Home Owners' Loan Corporation identified the "infiltration of Negroes and Orientals"² as justification to avoid investing in East and West Oakland neighborhoods, reverberates today; a 2016 report found that "African Americans and Hispanics, representing 56% of the [Oakland] population, received just 10% of mortgage dollars lent."³ Redlining compounded the impact of racially restrictive covenants that prevented people of color from living elsewhere in Oakland, resulting in a segregated city with deep-rooted disparities. Urban renewal in the middle of the 20th century brought the Nimitz Freeway to West Oakland, dividing neighborhoods of color and leaving the surviving communities to reckon with the noise and pollution of a major highway in their backyard. Today, people living in West Oakland go to the emergency room for asthma-related conditions at twice the rate of the rest of Alameda County.⁴ Across the city on East Oakland's International Boulevard, the 24-acre site of a former General Electric factory remains contaminated with lead, asbestos, and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) nearly four decades after it was ordered to be cleaned up by the Environmental Protection Agency.⁵ A black baby born today in East Oakland has a life expectancy 14 years less than that of a white baby born in the Oakland Hills. That East Oakland baby is twice as likely to be underweight at birth; as a child, she is three times less likely to read at grade level and twenty-one times more likely to live in poverty; and as an adult, she is six times more likely to be unemployed and two-and-a-half times more likely to die of a stroke.⁶

The deadly consequences of policies – whether official or unofficial – on people of color are evident in the use of the police force. Brought to the forefront of the national conversation by the 2009 shooting of 22-year-old African American Oscar Grant at the Fruitvale BART station, Oakland's law enforcement has long struggled to overcome patterns of behavior that target boys and men of color. In 2003, the City of Oakland entered into a \$10.9 million settlement with 119 plaintiffs following a civil rights lawsuit alleging that members of the Oakland Police Department (OPD) planted evidence, beat suspects, and made false arrests. All but one of the 119 plaintiffs were black.⁷ This began more than a decade of federal oversight of the OPD that was unprecedented for a U.S. city. In 2016, Stanford University researchers published an analysis of 28,119 traffic and pedestrian stops made by OPD between 2013 and 2014. They found that, even after controlling for neighborhood crime rates and demographics, "OPD officers stopped, searched, handcuffed, and arrested more African Americans than Whites."⁸

They found that black men were four times more likely to be searched than whites, “though officers were no more likely to make a recovery from those searches,”⁹ and were four times more likely to be handcuffed during stops that *did not* lead to arrests. Another Stanford study, published in 2017, found that Oakland “police officers speak significantly less respectfully to black than to white community members in everyday traffic stops, even after controlling for officer race, infraction severity, stop location, and stop outcome,”¹⁰ results that the researchers gleaned from analyzing 183 hours of body camera footage from 981 stops.

The past decade of economic development has resulted in poorly distributed gains, as elected officials strategically prioritized attracting business, new residents, and downtown development over investing in low-income communities of long-term Oakland residents. Although Alameda County has the sixth highest per-capita income of any county in California,¹¹ it has a Gini coefficient, which is used to measure economic inequality, on par with Honduras and Rwanda.¹² Oakland’s low-income areas conspicuously overlap with black, Latino, and Asian neighborhoods, areas where homicide rates are high and low-performing schools are concentrated.¹³ Between 2000 and 2014, there was a 31% drop in the African American population of Oakland – a net loss of 43,777 black residents – and there are indications that the 2020 Census will show that these trends have continued over the past several years.¹⁴ The mass migration of blacks out of Oakland while the economy improves is symptomatic of the ways the Bay Area is evolving to cater to the ballooning tech sector, with Oakland specifically positioning itself as a more affordable alternative to San Francisco or Silicon Valley for both startups and corporate giants.¹⁵ The result is often displacement of long-term residents, as the mean rent for a 1-bedroom apartment has nearly doubled since 2011¹⁶ and Oakland is now the fourth most expensive rental market in the U.S.¹⁷

John Jones, a third-generation Oakland native and community organizer, reports that “inequality is everywhere in Oakland,” ticking off the ways inequality manifests itself in housing, economic, and educational disparities: “there are so many moving parts to it; there isn’t just one source.”¹⁸ Teddy Kÿ-Nam Miller, the Economic Equity Director of the Greenlining Institute, an Oakland-based organization working for racial and economic justice, calls the status quo “the result of economic violence and political violence consciously engineered against people of color.”¹⁹ One result of the long history of discrimination is widespread political disengagement among people of color in Oakland. Jones notes, “Apathy is created when people lose faith in elected officials.”²⁰ Divergent rates of political participation in Oakland by race and income level bear out Jones’ observation.

Objectives of this Report

To counteract the systems that have led to these disparate outcomes, this report identifies the most effective policies for building political power among Oakland's underserved communities and advancing racial and economic equity in the city. Building political power in this context manifests as improving marginalized communities' access to and influence over local candidates and elected officials so that they are responsive to addressing those communities' priorities.

Across the country, studies show a strong correlation between communities that are politically active and the responsiveness of elected officials to their concerns.²¹ Elected officials and candidates for office are most responsive to two groups. The first is voters: elected officials have little incentive to expend political capital responding to priorities of people who do not cast ballots. There is substantial evidence that "government rewards those who vote."²² Political scientists John Griffin and Brian Newman put it this way: "if poorer Americans or minority groups are underrepresented, it makes sense that their lower rates of participation [as voters] may be an important causal factor in their lesser ability to garner the benefits of representation."²³ The second and more influential group is political donors. Research indicates that elected officials are more responsive to donors' interests and priorities than voters,²⁴ and that non-constituent donors have more influence on policymakers than constituent non-donors.²⁵ Political scientist Martin Gilens shows that when federal policy preferences diverge by income level, "the views of the affluent make a big difference, while support among the middle class and the poor has almost no relationship to policy outcomes," and identifies the upper-income group's disproportionate status as donors as an explanation. "Low-income Americans are distinctive in their lower rates of voting and volunteering, while the differences between middle-income and affluent Americans are modest. But when it comes to campaign donations, high-income Americans stand out. Political donations, then, but not voting or volunteering, replicate the pattern of representational inequality described above: the affluent are distinctively influential while the middle class typically has no more sway than the poor."²⁶ For these reasons, throughout this report, "political participation" refers to voting and donating to political candidates, though political protest, volunteering for a campaign, contacting elected officials, and running for office are other important means for people to participate in politics.


Political inequality occurs when certain people have greater access to and influence over the political system than others, leading to an unequal distribution of policies' benefits and burdens, and it manifests itself along racial and socioeconomic lines in Oakland. Oakland's low-income residents and people of color have low levels of political participation, which likely leads to low levels of access to and influence over local candidates and elected officials. There is a growing body of evidence demonstrating the potential of public policies to shift these dynamics. This report delves into that evidence and uses quantitative and qualitative analysis to reveal how these policies, if implemented, could impact Oakland. Having begun by introducing the problem of race and class-based inequalities in Oakland, this report will demonstrate the link between low rates of political participation and inequitable outcomes for people of color and


poor people in Oakland. Next, the report examines different types of policy proposals that may be effective in addressing the root causes of political inequality, followed by an examination of three specific policies focused on financial contributions to political candidates. After addressing factors that may limit extrapolation from the results of other cities' policies onto Oakland, the report projects the outcomes and impacts of the three policy proposals. The report concludes with recommendations for a policy best suited to build political power among Oakland's low-income neighborhoods and communities of color, including implementation guidance intended to maximize the likelihood of a policy's effectiveness.

Why does Political Inequality Matter?


Political participation varies significantly by Oakland's seven city council districts. Relatively wealthy and white District 1 and 4 residents register to vote, turn out to vote, and donate to political candidates at significantly higher rates than residents of mostly low-income, highly diverse Districts 5 and 7. District 1, which borders Berkeley and includes the Oakland Hills, is the only district in Oakland that is majority white and 13% of its population has a household income over \$200,000. District 4 is more diverse with 42% white residents, and is just as wealthy as District 1, with 14% of its population living in households earning over \$200,000. In comparison, District 5, which includes the neighborhoods of Fruitvale and Jingletown in East Oakland, is 48% Latino, 20% Asian, 16% black, and 14% white. District 7, located in far East Oakland, is the city's least white district, with a population that is 45% Latino, 41% black, 5% Asian, and 6% white. In both Districts 5 and 7, three in ten people live in households with incomes below \$25,000 and only 3% earn above \$200,000.²⁷ Districts 1 and 4 are not only wealthier and whiter than the city overall, but also experience far lower rates of homicide²⁸ and far higher rates of educational attainment, with 64% of those living in District 1 having at least a Bachelor's degree, compared with only 15% of District 7. More than three in ten District 5 and 7 residents over the age of 25 do not have a high school diploma, five times the rate of District 1. A District 5 resident is seven times more likely to report speaking English only "well" or less than someone in District 1.²⁹

Oakland Districts by the Numbers






Turning to political engagement, there were twice as many registered voters in District 1 than in District 5 in May 2018.³⁰ Examining the number of registered voters as a proportion of each district's citizens of voting age population (CVAP), to account for the higher numbers of non-voting eligible people in certain neighborhoods, Districts 5 and 7 still lag behind District 1 and 4. Based on CVAP numbers from 2014, the most recent year for which the data is available, over 99% of District 1's citizens of voting age were registered to vote in 2018 compared to 83% of District 5. Comparing voter turnout, 69.6% of District 1's CVAP cast ballots in 2016, compared to 50.5% of District 5 and 52.5% of District 7.³¹ These patterns are consistent with national level trends: in the 2010 midterm election, citizens earning over \$150,000 voted "as high as 35 percentage points more than low-income citizens" earning below \$30,000.³²



Note: District 4 is excluded from voter turnout and donation analysis because even-numbered districts did not elect a councilmember in 2016.

These disparities are even starker when it comes to making contributions to local political candidates. In the 2016 at-large city council race, which elects a councilmember to represent the entire city, only three of the 689 Oakland-based donations above the \$100 reporting threshold came from District 5, while 218 came from District 4.³³ Teddy K̄y-Nam Miller says that one way that political inequality manifests itself is through “the outsized influence of people in the Oakland Hills, who tend to be white, affluent, and able to navigate the city’s gatekeepers, and the diminished influence of lower-income and communities of color, and African Americans in particular.”³⁴

Percentage of Political Contributions from Oakland Residents by Zip Code



Source: MapLight

Policy preferences vary by city council district, as well. The 2017 Oakland City Survey, commissioned by the City of Oakland, demonstrates that there are significant disparities in the experiences and policy preferences of Oakland residents by neighborhood. Weighing in on the relative spending merited for five goals set forth by the Oakland mayor and city council, District 1 and 4 residents were more likely than Oakland residents overall to seek investment in city services and District 7 residents were more likely to prioritize spending on “a safe city.” District 5 residents were disproportionately likely to support spending to promote “an equitable and diverse community.”³⁵

Asked to rate their quality of life, “there are significant differences between white residents and residents of color, and between residents of higher and lower socioeconomic status. Residents of color – specifically African-Americans – and lower-income residents give lower ratings to their quality of life.”³⁶ While 41% of District 4


residents rate the city's provision of services as excellent or good, only 29% of District 5 residents and 30% of District 7 agree. African Americans, women without a college degree, and longtime Oakland residents are most likely to rate the city's provisions of services as poor.³⁷ City Councilmember Annie Campbell Washington, who represents District 4, identifies one systemic reason behind this imbalance: "local government services are historically delivered on a complaint basis, and the neighborhoods that have the time and ability to call and complain and badger their officials have more services. This equates to historical investment in these communities and historical disinvestment in other communities."³⁸ The complaint-based system (in comparison to a needs-based system) for addressing potholes, illegal dumping, and blight can result in misallocated resources and disparities in the distribution of city services.

The 2017 survey, along with prior years' iterations that identified similar patterns, reveals that the districts with high levels of voting and financial contributions to local candidates report higher quality of life and distinct policy preferences compared to Oakland overall, and in particular compared to the city's poorest districts. This follows a pattern established by academic studies revealing that "those who do not have the money or time, and who do not belong to pre-existing organizations with resources, are less able to participate and less likely to have their needs taken into account when policies are decided."³⁹ When asked how this impacts her organization and the causes they champion, Kimi Lee, director of Bay Rising, a coalition of community organizations in the Bay Area, describes a series of issues, mentioning everything from the educational disparities between public schools in the Oakland Hills and the Flatlands to the pollution of East Oakland's International Boulevard.⁴⁰ Lee's observations are borne out by evidence that the areas of the city with more white and affluent residents have access to better resources, like higher-performing schools,⁴¹ while areas where lower-income people of color live are disproportionately burdened with challenges like polluted transportation corridors.⁴²

Patterns of political inequality can create self-perpetuating cycles, with politically active citizens reaping the benefits of being engaged, thus incentivizing them to continue participating, while nonvoters witness a political system that does not work for people like them and have little incentive to begin engaging. Councilmember Campbell Washington identifies "a situation where in the past, you would call public works to get your pothole fixed and you wouldn't get a response. But then some communities became so disengaged that now they never call."⁴³ The fact that people of color and low-income residents are more likely to rate the city's provision of services as poor is one piece of evidence that the city is not meeting the needs of all of its residents equally. Lee says that since Oakland's communities of color have been "marginalized by the system, there's no incentive for them to actually then partake in the system that has oppressed them."⁴⁴

Research cited by Bernard Fraga in a 2016 paper suggests that “the proposed mechanism by which empowerment impacts turnout is an internal process, whereby individuals choose to participate when they feel their participation is likely to have an impact on politics.”⁴⁵ It is unsurprising that “political and economic inequality are mutually reinforcing”⁴⁶ – both for the engaged and the apathetic.

Cycle of Political Engagement



Policy Proposals to Tackle Political Inequality

In order to be viable alternatives for Oakland, the policy proposals analyzed in this report must be effective at improving rates of political participation, both as voters and as donors, in Oakland’s marginalized communities. Since individual voter level data identifying demographic characteristics of voters or donors is not available, I focus my analysis on political participation in Oakland city council Districts 5 and 7, which serve as proxies for Oakland’s low-income, black, Latino, and Asian populations.

I measure political participation from Districts 5 and 7 by their share of citywide votes cast for the at-large council races. By focusing on the *share* of votes from each district and how that proportion changes over time, instead of looking at raw turnout rates, I am able to control for the varying CVAPs in each district, as well as the inevitable differences in turnout for competitive and non-competitive election cycles.

District 5 and 7 residents face a variety of hurdles to participating in local elections, both as voters and as donors. Those barriers may be legal, logistical, financial,

psychological, language-related, or due to low interest or awareness. While not all of the barriers must be addressed simultaneously, a proposal that pulls multiple policy levers will be more likely to meaningfully increase political participation.

Some policies explicitly target voting through electoral reform. California already has many electoral reforms in place to lower barriers to voting, such as reinstatement of voting rights for people sentenced to state or federal prison upon completion of parole, no-excuse vote-by-mail, pre-registration for 16 and 17 year olds, and limited same day registration. Additionally, Oakland has ranked choice voting (also called instant runoff voting) and district-based elections of councilmembers, two policies that many advocates believe result in a more equitable process and better representation for underserved communities. The options for local electoral reform are limited because many of the most obvious policy opportunities must be instituted at the county or state level. Others, like restoration of voting rights for people on parole, require a voter-led amendment to the California State Constitution.

Another avenue for policies is to target the high-dollar donations coming into elections by focusing on contribution limits. An analysis of a policy to lower Oakland's contribution limits begins on page 24.

The policies that are the focus of this analysis target political participation through incentivizing donations to candidates. This can be done through policy mechanisms that use public financing of elections to shift incentives for candidates, citizens, or both. Evidence reveals that financial contributions are a very powerful tool for building political power by gaining influence among candidates and elected officials – more so than participation at the ballot box.⁴⁷ Financial contributions may also break the cycle of disengagement which leads to a lack of government responsiveness, which then leads to further disengagement. Anthony Corrado, public financing expert and board chair of the Campaign Finance Institute, a nonpartisan think tank, explains that “the key is giving candidates the incentives to go out and solicit these contributions.”⁴⁸ Since California law does not permit statewide public financing, any solution involving public financing must be pursued at the city level in Oakland, which operates under home rule as a Charter City.

Alternatives that failed to fulfill standards of equitable impact, constitutionality, political feasibility, and cost-efficiency relative to other proposals are not explored in depth in this report. Appendix C includes a description of alternatives that were considered but found not to meet these requirements, including targeted tax rebates, block grants, universal basic income, compulsory voting, and parolee voting.

Policy Options

Public Financing: Multiple Matching Funds in New York City and Los Angeles

Established in 1988, New York City runs the United States' longest standing and most extensive program to use public financing for political campaigns. The program operates as a matching fund, where small-dollar individual donations to qualified local candidates are matched by taxpayer dollars. Counting among its objectives making the donor base more reflective of New York City's diverse population, the program has evolved since 1988, starting as a 1:1 matching program, increasing the match to 4:1 in 2001, and increasing it again to the current 6:1 match in 2009. Under today's program, the first \$175 of a New York City resident's contribution are matched at a rate of 6:1 by public funds. This means that a \$10 donation is worth \$70 (the original \$10 donation is added to \$60 in public funds) and a \$175 donation is worth \$1,225 to a participating candidate. To qualify for matching funds, city council candidates must collect 75 contributions of at least \$10 from within their district and must raise a minimum of \$5,000.^{49 50} They must abide by contribution limits and expenditure limits⁵¹ and other rules set forth by the New York City Campaign Finance Board, which administers the program. Candidates must be on the ballot and have an opponent who is also on the ballot.⁵²


In order to ascertain the impact of the 6:1 matching funds, also called a "multiple match," on voting, this analysis identifies New York City Council Districts 18 and 37 as proxies for Oakland's Districts 5 and 7 based on similarities in terms of racial makeup and poverty levels, among other factors. New York District 18, made up of Bronx neighborhoods Parkchester, Soundview, and Castle Hill, is 58% Latino, 30% black, 6% Asian and 3% white, and 29% of its residents live below the poverty line. Located in Brooklyn's Bushwick and Cypress Hills neighborhoods, District 37 is 56% Latino, 30% black, 6% Asian, and 4% white, with 32% living below the poverty line.^{53 54} More detailed information about how New York Districts 18 and 37 were selected as proxies for Oakland's Districts 5 and 7 is available in Appendix A.

Proxy districts are useful because individual voters cannot be identified by race, income, or other demographic characteristics, but this data is available at the district level. Additionally, the measure of political participation is based on how each district's share of citywide votes changes over time, rather than raw turnout. This is important because each district has a different population size and number of eligible voters, and by looking at changes in the citywide share over time, it is possible to control for the natural variation in engagement levels between elections; raw turnout for a certain district during a competitive mayoral year like 2009 should not be compared to turnout in a year without a competitive mayoral race, like 2017. By examining the *proportion* of citywide votes, rather than the raw rate of participation, this analysis controls for the expected variation in participation in different elections.⁵⁵

New York City's residents elect their city councilmembers every four years. Due to the many other political, economic, demographic, and social factors that have altered New York City's electoral landscape since the program began in 1988, this analysis is unable to draw meaningful conclusions about how the existence of a matching program has impacted political participation rates in New York. Instead, this report analyzes changes since the 2005 election, which was the last election with the smaller 4:1 match in place. Voter turnout in low-income, highly diverse Districts 18 and 37 decreased as a proportion of citywide votes cast in most elections since 2005. The range of outcomes varied from a 19.3% decrease to a 4.5% increase and the average change per election from 2005 to 2017 is a 5.9% decrease.⁵⁶ Some of this decrease could be attributable to a change in demographics in these districts; for example, if many non-citizen immigrants moved to these districts between 2005 and 2017, lowering the districts' citizens' voting age population (CVAP), the voter turnout rate would be expected to fall. Though data on how the CVAP for these districts has shifted over time is not available, this analysis controls for any changes by next comparing the turnout of voters from the same districts in citywide and statewide elections.

To control for potential changes in demographics and isolate the impact of the increased multiple match on District 18 and 37 residents, this analysis compares the share of citywide and statewide votes from the same District 18 and 37 residents. Since there is no public financing at the state level, the New York gubernatorial races are the control group. Districts 18 and 37's participation as a share of total votes cast decreased at both the city and the state level since the increase of the New York City match in 2005. However, the decrease over three election cycles is 16.9% higher in the state races (control group) than in the city races (treatment group). This suggests that while there is a correlation between the larger match and lower turnout among the communities of interest, it is not attributable to the increase in the matching rate, and that the increase in matching rate may have in fact played a role in counteracting a larger decrease, as was seen at the state level, from appearing at the city level. Advocates for matching funds propose that the mechanism for this connection is that "being asked to contribute – even small amounts – increases citizen interest in participation in elections"⁵⁷ and for candidates, instead of using fundraising to pay for voter outreach, as is the case in traditional campaigns, fundraising is fused with voter outreach.

New York: Change in District 18 and 37 Voters' Share of Votes Cast Citywide vs. Statewide



To examine changes in financial contributions from low-income people and people of color that are attributable to the multiple matching program, this analysis does not employ the proxy district method to project outcomes. Due to significant differences in thresholds for disclosing campaign contributions by city and limitations in data collection and reporting, this report relies on published research into how the multiple match impacts financial contributions from low-income people and people of color citywide.

A 2012 study compared the different rates of small donations from low-income and highly diverse neighborhoods to New York City Council and New York State Assembly candidates, where, as in all statewide races, there is no public financing. Showing the value of increasing the share of small donors, the researchers found that “the neighborhoods in which City Council small donors reside are more representative of New York City as a whole. They have lower incomes, higher poverty rates, and higher concentrations of minority residents than the neighborhoods where State Assembly small donors reside.”⁵⁸ The evidence for higher rates of donations from marginalized communities in elections with the multiple match is compelling: “24 times more small donors from one poor, predominantly black neighborhood gave to City Council candidates (with a matching program) than to State Assembly candidates (without one).”⁵⁹ These findings “support the claim that small donor matching funds help bring participants into the political process who traditionally are less likely to be active”⁶⁰ and “help shift the demographic and class profile of those who give.”⁶¹ Evidence suggests that matching funds “tend not to work directly and spontaneously upon donors. Rather, they work by giving donor-mobilizers - who are mostly the candidates - an incentive to publicize the program by using it to round up new contributions. Everything depends upon the behavior of the candidates, and the candidates’ behavior will be structured by the incentives.”⁶²

In an interview with the Brennan Center for Justice, current New York State Senator and former New York City Councilmember José Serrano spoke of how the multiple match impacted his campaigning when he was a candidate for city council: "I'm in a community, the south Bronx, where there aren't a lot of people with great personal wealth. This is a working class community, and my neighbors can't drop \$1,000. But being able to raise \$10, and with the match being so significant, really made these small donors very important [as a city council candidate]. It not only empowered me, but it empowered the community as well. So public campaign financing empowers communities as well as candidates . . . Once I ran for the Senate, it was extremely different . . . I was taking on a very well-financed candidate. My campaign was raising money, but we knew we couldn't raise as much from local people because we weren't getting matches. As a result, we started seeing more high-dollar fundraisers."⁶³ While there are other factors that likely account for some of the variation between the city and state races, such as differing term limits and levels of enthusiasm about different races, the 2012 study found that the evidence points to public financing playing "a significant role" on donor diversity levels.⁶⁴

There are also indications from New York's program that there could be negative outcomes caused by an increased match. An informed large donor could strategically give \$250 to four candidates to achieve a bigger financial impact than giving \$1,000 to one. There was a relatively high level of donors giving exactly \$175 (the limit for the full 6:1 match) in 2009, providing "very strong evidence in support of the claim that people who were knowledgeable about the law - most likely candidates - were educating potential donors and influencing their behavior."⁶⁵ As with all public financing programs, participating candidates do face the risk of a competitor who is well-funded (including self-funded candidates) and not bound by the public financing program's stricter regulations. Until 2011, there were additional funds available to candidates that could be triggered if an opponent or outside group spent a certain amount of money; however, a Supreme Court ruling on an Arizona matching funds program found that the triggering component was unconstitutional, holding that it "substantially burdens the speech of privately financed candidates and independent expenditure groups without fulfilling a compelling state interest."⁶⁶

Notably, the proportion of small donors, who are more likely to be representative of the city's diverse demographics, fell in the most recent city election, raising concerns among campaign finance experts about the "system that 'set the standard.'"⁶⁷ In 2017, the percentage of candidates' funding coming from small donors fell to a lower rate than in 2001 and 2005, when there was a 4:1 match. The rates fell for both incumbent candidates and challengers. Excluding the matching public dollars (in other words, looking only at the base of private donations), 2017 actually had a lower level of small dollar donations (29%) than in 1997 (35%).⁶⁸ Early analysis suggests that is likely due to not only a decrease in the raw number of small donors but also an increase in large donations (which in this analysis is donations over \$250), so the decrease of small donors' influence was not only relative but also absolute.⁶⁹ Causes for this shift in the most recent election are unclear and merit further investigation.


To compare the relative impact of the *magnitude* of multiple match rates on incentivizing donations (in other words, identifying how the impact of a 6:1 match rate differs from a 4:1 or 2:1 match), this report examines Los Angeles, which increased its match from 1:1 to 2:1 in its first-round (March) elections and to 4:1 in the second-round (May) elections. This increased match was first implemented for odd seats in 2013 and even seats in 2015. After New York, Los Angeles is the U.S. city with the most robust public financing program currently in place. The extensive redistricting before the 2013 election makes it impossible to identify district-level changes in voter participation attributable to the increased multiple match, because changes could be due to significant shifts in district boundaries and demographics. Therefore, instead of conducting research based on proxy districts in Los Angeles, this analysis relies upon Campaign Finance Institute research evaluating the impact of the increased match on people of color and low-income people in Los Angeles. More detailed information about methodology is available in Appendix A.

Evaluating data through the 2015 elections, research suggests that New York's 6:1 matching "program increased the number, proportional role, and diversity of small donors in City Council elections but that the [2:1 or 4:1] Los Angeles program was substantially less effective."⁷⁰ In Los Angeles, "the two-tiered matching rate was not enough to increase the role of small donors, which was one of the city charter's stated goals for the system." However, "there does appear to have been a modest improvement in the racial and economic diversity of the neighborhoods producing small donors."⁷¹ Because information about race and income level is unavailable at the individual level, this study tracks demographics of Census Block Groups (CBGs), which the U.S. Census identifies as "generally defined to contain between 600 and 3,000 people."⁷² Since Los Angeles does not require disclosure of the source of campaign contributions below \$100, this analysis' threshold of "small" donors is relatively high, consisting of donations between \$100 and \$250. The CBGs where these "small" donors lived were "substantially less diverse"⁷³ in the elections with a 1:1 matching rate (2009 and 2011) than in the elections with higher matching rates (2013 and 2015). This observation may offer insight into one reason that Oakland's existing 1:1 reimbursement program has been ineffective in meeting its objectives.

For Oakland to run a 6:1 matching fund program with a lower \$50 limit, I estimate the annual cost to be \$1.68 million for city council and mayoral elections. This is a rough estimate for a program that limits the match to donations totaling \$50 and below (the first \$50 of larger donations would *not* be matched). This estimate is based on the budgeted cost in Berkeley, not actual costs, and could be considerably lower if donor participation is lower than expected. Alternate methods could include calculating the cost based on current small dollar donations to city council and mayoral campaigns or the current cost to run a successful campaign in Oakland. See Appendix B for the calculations involved in reaching this estimate.

Public Financing: Democracy Vouchers in Seattle


In an effort to improve political access for people who have traditionally been excluded from the electoral process, Seattle voters passed an innovative model of public financing that went into effect in 2017. Every registered voter was mailed four \$25 “democracy vouchers” that they could donate to any qualified candidate in the city council and city attorney races. Additionally, Seattle residents who are over 18 years old and U.S. citizens or permanent residents could request vouchers even if they are not registered to vote. In order for a city council candidate to qualify to accept vouchers in 2017, she had to receive 400 qualifying donations between \$10 and \$250 and collect 400 signatures from Seattle residents, participate in public debates, and agree to lower campaign contribution and spending caps.⁷⁴



In Seattle, District 2 serves as a demographically similar proxy for Districts 5 and 7 in Oakland.⁷⁵ The only Seattle district that is less than two-thirds white, District 2 is 36% Asian, 21% black, and 9% Latino, with half the residents speaking a language other than English at home and the highest percentage of people living in poverty.⁷⁶ More detailed information about how Seattle District 2 was selected as a proxy is available in Appendix A.

This analysis compares the change in District 2 residents' share of votes cast in citywide and statewide races. Since there is no public financing at the state level, the Washington governor's races are the control group. The share of citywide ballots cast by voters located in District 2 increased by 8.8% from 2013 to 2017,⁷⁷ while the share of District 2 votes in Washington's gubernatorial races increased by 3.7% from 2012 to 2016. This suggests that while votes from this high-poverty, highly diverse section of Seattle were likely to increase as a share of all votes cast in 2017 even without democracy vouchers, the increase was 240% higher than in the race with no public financing in place. The results imply that democracy vouchers may have played a significant role in increasing voter turnout from Seattle's District 2.

Seattle: Change in District 2 Voters' Share of Votes Cast Citywide vs. Statewide



Researchers Brian J. McCabe and Jennifer Heerwig with the University of Washington Center for Studies in Demography and Ecology also identified a positive correlation between voucher use and increased voting rates. Their spring 2018 study, which linked individual voter file data with voucher return data, found that "among Seattle residents who voted in fewer than half of the previous elections for which they were eligible . . . 53 percent of these voucher users voted in the 2017 election compared to only 12 percent of those who did not return their voucher."⁷⁸ In other words, traditionally low-turnout voters who donated using democracy vouchers were four times more likely to actually vote in 2017 than traditionally low-turnout voters who did not use vouchers.

As with the analysis of New York City, to examine changes in financial contributions from low-income people and people of color that are attributable to democracy vouchers this analysis does not employ the proxy district method. Due to significant differences in thresholds for disclosing campaign contributions by city, limitations in the way data is collected and reported, and the fact that neighborhood-based districts were instituted for the first time in 2015 (prior to 2015, all nine districts were elected at-large),

this report depends on external analysis of how the democracy voucher program impacted financial contributions from low-income people and people of color citywide.

In 2017, the first year of the democracy voucher program, 14% of democracy vouchers to city attorney and at-large city council candidates came from District 2, the third highest percentage of the city's seven council districts.⁷⁹ Citywide, results indicate that the vouchers have incentivized previously disengaged Seattle citizens to donate, both with vouchers and with cash. Research conducted by Every Voice and Win/Win Network, two nonprofit organizations that promote public financing of elections, estimated that "84% of this cycle's Seattle donors were new donors – about 20,900 individuals who had not contributed to city candidates in the 2015 or 2013 cycles. Among these new donors, 71% were voucher donors."⁸⁰

Because vouchers were not accepted for the Seattle mayor's race (they will be in 2021), it is possible to examine the effect of vouchers by comparing the differences between the donors to the mayoral race and the donors to races where vouchers were accepted. In the city council and city attorney races, where vouchers were used by all but one competitive candidate,⁸¹ "neighborhoods with household incomes below the city median [\$80,000] saw a 44% improvement in their share of giving among voucher donors, compared to their share of mayoral cash" and "neighborhoods where people of color are the majority saw a 46% improvement in their share of giving among voucher donors, compared to their share of mayoral cash."^{82 83}

Comparing voucher users to cash donors in all races, McCabe and Heerwig found that while the "racial composition of voucher users is nearly identical to the composition of cash donors," the voucher program "increased the representation of low-income residents in the campaign finance system."⁸⁴ Evaluating the ways that the program was more successful at closing the socioeconomic gap than the racial gap in political participation in its first application, the researchers note that "these findings create an opportunity for community stakeholders to further engage underrepresented groups to increase their participation in the Democracy Voucher program."⁸⁵

Teresa Mosqueda, the newly elected District 8 councilmember who raised two-thirds of her campaign funds from democracy vouchers,⁸⁶ identifies a corollary benefit in addition to a field of donors that is more representative of Seattle's demographics: "I'm still paying rent, I still pay student loans. I think the intent was to try to get more folks who aren't independently wealthy who have a job like I do to be able to see themselves running for office."⁸⁷ Tam Doan, the Policy and Research Director with Every Voice, agrees. "These programs also make it possible for women and candidates with diverse backgrounds, who come from local communities, to run and win office – this means a deeper connection to neighborhood needs and priorities that may not currently be reflected among elected officials,"⁸⁸ she explains. Recent research suggests that the 2017 election also saw significant increases in the proportion of donations to city council and city attorney candidates originating within Seattle. City council candidates received 93% of their contributions from within the city in 2017, compared to 65-80% in 2015, while candidates in the mayoral race (where there was no public financing) "raised funds in-city consistent with pre-voucher levels."⁸⁹

Jon Grant, another candidate for the District 8 seat who participated in the democracy voucher program, “helped register and collected vouchers from people living in several homeless encampments,”⁹⁰ an example of how the accessibility of vouchers to people not registered to vote provides incentive to reach out to the disengaged, including the very poor, the formerly incarcerated, and people experiencing homelessness. “If we had a concerted effort to register, educate, and organize renters and people who are homeless as a political force, our city politics would look rather different than they currently do,” said Alison Eisinger of the Seattle/King County Coalition on Homelessness in remarks to *The Guardian*.⁹¹

Since democracy vouchers do not require the donor to have any personal monetary stake in the contribution, the financial barrier to donating is eliminated. This may be a benefit when compared to the multiple match, which requires some level of disposable income in order to participate: “With the public match, you still need someone to put some skin in the game, whether that’s \$10 or \$25,” describes Anthony Corrado.⁹² Being engaged in this manner may address the psychological barrier to participating as voters, as well. Gina Owens, a first-time donor in Seattle, says “my income has never been the highest in Seattle, so I always had a problem using my finances for campaigns, when I have to take care of home.” Because of the democracy voucher program, she says “People like me can contribute in ways that we never have before. We can participate in ways that big money always has.”⁹³

Since Seattle’s 2017 election was the first and only worldwide to institute a voucher model, there is a limit to what can be extrapolated after one election. There were also multiple other policies being implemented for the first time in 2017’s election, such as lowered limits on campaign contributions and increased reporting and disclosure requirements.⁹⁴ Additionally, the King County (where Seattle is located) Elections office and the Seattle Foundation, a philanthropic foundation dedicated to advancing economic equity, collaborated to award \$435,000 in grants to 30 nonprofits in 2017 with the objective of increasing “civic engagement and voting among communities of color, people with disabilities, low-income youth, veterans, people experiencing homelessness, limited English-speaking communities and reinstated voters who have been convicted of a felony.”⁹⁵ ⁹⁶ While a pilot version of the grant, called the “Voter Education Fund,” was rolled out in 2016, the program’s funding and scope were greatly expanded in 2017. Since the objectives of the program overlap with the objectives of democracy vouchers, there may have been multiple factors at play leading to the increase in political participation among Seattle’s low-income people and communities of color.

While more analysis is needed to examine whether the established correlation between donating and other forms of political participation, like voting and volunteering, holds when the money donated comes from public funds and not from an individual’s bank account, the results from Seattle suggest a promising start and almost certainly an improvement over the status quo in terms of political participation for all members of society. As with all public financing programs, participating candidates do face the risk of a competitor who is well-funded and not bound by public financing’s regulations. The one general election candidate who chose not to participate in the voucher program,

city attorney candidate Scott Lindsay, significantly outraised incumbent Pete Holmes in cash donations, but Holmes more than made up the difference with democracy vouchers⁹⁷ and won the seat by a margin of nearly three-to-one.⁹⁸

Funding for the vouchers comes from a property tax increase of \$1.94 per \$100,000 in assessed home value – \$19.40 annually for a million-dollar home.⁹⁹ It is predicted that only 13% of residents would be able to use their vouchers before the program ran out of money, though proponents argue that the rate of 1-1.5% of adults who contribute to local campaigns in most cities is so low that the program running out of money is not a realistic concern.¹⁰⁰ Indeed, 20,727 Seattle residents participated in the voucher program in 2017,¹⁰¹ which is about 3.4% of the city's adult population.¹⁰² While this fact brings down the costs of the program, it also reveals an essential constraint of democracy vouchers, or any other program that aims to increase the number of people who have a financial stake in elections: the baseline of people who donate is so low that even a policy that prompts a three-fold increase in participation, which was the increase in Seattle compared to 2013,¹⁰³ will still reach only a limited number of people.

For Oakland to implement a similarly-sized democracy voucher program in its city council and mayoral elections, the rough estimate of an annual cost is \$2.35 million. This is based on the budgeted cost (not the actual cost) in Seattle and is likely at the upper end of a range of possible costs. Alternate cost estimate methods, such as calculating the cost based on current candidate spending in Oakland, could result in different ranges. See Appendix B for the calculations involved in reaching this estimate.

Lowering Campaign Contribution Limits

Another policy proposal that aims to level the campaign money playing field does so by curbing contributions at the top instead of boosting contributions at the bottom. Lowering the individual contribution limit to campaigns is a policy that could decrease the proportional influence of high dollar contributors. These donors tend to be unrepresentative of the demographics of the citizenry, and at least at the state and national levels, are not reflective of the policy preferences of the population overall.¹⁰⁴

California cities have adopted contribution limits for city council candidates ranging from \$100 to \$4,200.¹⁰⁵ Under the Oakland Campaign Reform Act (OCRA), “for candidates who do not [emphasis added] agree to limit their spending, the maximum contribution from any person is \$200 per election.”¹⁰⁶ For candidates that do agree to these voluntary limits to their campaign spending, “the maximum contribution from any person is \$800 per election.”¹⁰⁷ The intention behind OCRA’s higher limit for participating candidates is to incentivize candidates to agree to lower overall spending limits in exchange for higher contribution limits. Lowering the limit to \$100 for non-participating candidates and \$400 for participating candidates would maintain the scale of the existing incentive while halving the levels each type of candidate is allowed

to accept. Five California cities currently have a \$100 limit, the lowest in the state, though the largest city, Davis, has one-sixth the population of Oakland.¹⁰⁸ Since 93% of campaign contributions from Oakland residents came from fewer than 1% of the city's residents,¹⁰⁹ a change in policy could be expected to affect the individual behavior of very few residents. However, since 93% of donations in 2014 and 2016 were above \$100, lowering the limit to \$100 would have a substantial impact on the share of small-dollar donations going to candidates.

Nicolas Heidorn, Policy and Legal Director for California Common Cause, says limits "amplify the voices of smaller donors" and helps level the playing field for candidates who may not have wealthy donors backing them.¹¹⁰ However, as noted by political scientist Brian Adams, who focuses on local government at San Diego State University, "there's little research that shows contribution limits and public financing programs successfully reduce the overall amount of money spent in elections." Adams cautions that "if there is a positive impact, it's pretty minimal" and "there's not yet been any research on contribution limits in small cities, and very little in mid-sized cities."¹¹¹ It is possible that some of the positive impacts for participation in Seattle are attributable to the decreased campaign contribution limits, which fell from \$700 to \$500 in 2017 thanks to the same voter-approved ballot initiative that created democracy vouchers.¹¹² However, there is no current research that suggests lower limits at the local level lead to increased political participation.

One factor mitigating any potential effect of lower individual contribution ceilings is the limitations Oakland faces in restricting independent expenditures (IEs), which consist of spending by super Political Action Committees (super PACs), labor unions, trade associations, and other outside groups.¹¹³ In 2016, there was \$40,014 in independent expenditures in the District 5 election, representing a third of that race's total spending, while there were no reported IEs in the District 7 race.¹¹⁴ Lower campaign contribution limits could lead to higher IEs, as donors seeking to influence the political process lose an avenue to do so when direct contributions to candidates are further restricted. In an interview, an Oakland resident expressed concern that lower limits "may be counteractive. IEs have so much power and are such an easy option for people."¹¹⁵ In an article published in the *Cleveland State Law Review*, law professor Bruce Ledewitz makes the inverse relationship between individual contributions and IEs explicit, outlining a "plan to stop independent political spending by eliminating campaign contribution limits." Ledewitz relies on observations from states that have changed contribution limits to argue that individual limits "whatever their merits, are not worth their effect in creating and sustaining independent political spending" and points to California's adoption of limits in 2001 as possibly having "stimulated the growth of independent spending to its current massive levels."¹¹⁶ In 2014, the *Sacramento Bee* reported that outside spending ahead of California's statewide and legislative primaries had reached nearly \$23 million, and that "such spending has been a fixture of California races since 2001, following voters' approval of contribution limits for candidates."¹¹⁷

Recognizing the Ways Oakland is Unique – and Not So Unique

When extrapolating results from policies in other cities, it is important to recognize that inherent differences between cities' politics, cultures, and characteristics limit the ability to draw definitive conclusions about how one city's successful policy will play out in Oakland.

Oakland currently has a limited program of public financing for citywide elections. Created by the Limited Public Financing Act (LPFA) and undergoing major changes in 2010, Oakland's program consists of city-funded reimbursement of certain election-related expenses made by candidates who qualify and opt-in to the rules regulating public financing. As set out in the Oakland City Charter, the LPFA was passed in acknowledgement that "the financial strength of certain individuals or organizations should not enable them to exercise a disproportionate or controlling influence on the election of candidates," "to ensure that all individuals and interest groups in our city have a fair and equal opportunity to participate in elective and governmental processes," "to reduce the influence of large contributors with a specific financial stake in matters under consideration by the city, and to counter the perception that decisions are influenced more by the size of contributions than by the best interests of the people of Oakland."¹¹⁸

There is widespread agreement in Oakland that the LPFA, which can disburse up to \$155,000 citywide per election cycle, has not met its objectives due to limited funding and misaligned incentives for candidates and citizens. More thorough information about the challenges that the LPFA faces and recommendations for improvement is publicly available in the form of a December 2017 performance audit conducted by the Oakland City Auditor.¹¹⁹ Additionally, the Oakland Public Ethics Commission, responsible for implementation of the LPFA, is currently investigating the barriers to political participation in Oakland and will have a report forthcoming in Spring 2018.

In terms of election logistics, there are important differences between Oakland and the other cities examined in this report. In contrast to New York City, Los Angeles, and Seattle, Oakland has ranked choice voting (also called instant runoff voting), which replaces primaries. This could result in lower costs for a public financing program as only one election per year must be funded, or higher costs since less competitive candidates are not eliminated before the general election. New York and Los Angeles have term limits, Oakland and Seattle do not. As in Los Angeles, Oakland's even and odd districts vote for their councilmembers in alternating election cycles, while in Seattle and New York, district-based councilmembers are elected at the same time. Oakland's odd-numbered districts, including Districts 5 and 7, vote in years that coincide with presidential elections – 2012, 2016, 2020, etc. These are naturally high turnout years with strong incentives for even-numbered district residents to turn out, even though they are not electing their own councilmember. Even-numbered districts elect their representatives in years that coincide with the local mayoral and national midterm

elections (2010, 2014, 2018, etc.), which do not offer the same incentive for odd-numbered residents to turn out to vote. This may be a causal factor contributing to lower engagement of Districts 5 and 7 in citywide races.

Gentrification and displacement of long-term residents are major issues in Oakland. As noted earlier, 31% of Oakland's African American residents left the city between 2000 and 2014.¹²⁰ If low-income people and communities of color can no longer afford to live in Oakland, then policies aiming to increase their political power will be irrelevant. While acknowledging the need for expanded political participation, third-generation Oakland resident John Jones believes that "the most pressing thing we need to focus on is anti-displacement. We need to stop the pipeline of black people leaving Oakland."¹²¹

"You can't compare Oakland to any other city," counsels Jones, citing how much more diverse Oakland is than Seattle. "These issues are racially based and not happening in a vacuum."¹²² Miller points out that despite Oakland's politically progressive pedigree, where "many white folks have at least adopted the rhetoric of equity, walking the equity walk is a deeper and more challenging process that requires tough conversations and acknowledging historic racist legacies that persist today."¹²³

Projected Impacts and Trade-offs

As outlined earlier in the report, Oakland's District 5 and 7 residents face legal, logistical, financial, psychological, awareness, language and interest-related barriers to political participation in city elections, both as voters and as donors. While not all of these barriers must be addressed simultaneously, a policy may need to combine multiple proposals in order to be effective in meaningfully increasing voting and donation rates.

Based on analysis of the successes and shortcoming of the proposals outlined in this report, and applying information about Oakland's specific attributes, here is an examination of the likely impacts and trade-offs of the various policies considered.

	Voting Rates	Donation Rates	Estimated Annual Cost
Multiple Matching Funds			~\$1.68 million (based on budgeted cost in Berkeley)
Democracy Vouchers			~\$2.35 million (based on budgeted costs in Seattle)
Lower Campaign Contribution Limits			No cost

After attending a half-day meeting in Oakland about how public financing works in other cities, most respondents to a voluntary survey agreed that public financing "could be a tool to build political power among underserved communities in the Bay Area." Asked how public financing might affect the work of their organizations, an attendee representing a grassroots organizing group said that public financing "would allow us to draw distinctions between traditional candidates and candidates with our values around rejecting major corporate dollars." An environmental and racial justice organizer responded that public financing could "improve community involvement within our organization and create more opportunity to build local political power." Another attendee believed it could "create a more level playing field in City elections."¹²⁴

Asked to compare the merits of the multiple match and the democracy vouchers, Kimi Lee explains that "the organizer in me says the Seattle voucher one is more compelling because of the organizing impact" while "the matching 6:1 is attractive because we have so much tech money coming in"¹²⁵ to influence local elections and Lee views a large matching incentive as a way to compete with that money. Councilmember Campbell Washington also sees the two public financing models as "interesting in different ways. The multiple match program is a really good way to encourage someone who isn't

already in the political sphere to run. . . I do think it's an interesting thought experiment about providing access to new people." As for Seattle's model, she says "democracy vouchers are interesting in a different way that's about giving everyone a voice whether or not they can vote or whether or not they will vote. It's encouraging people to do the grassroots work of knocking doors, speaking with homeless people and formerly incarcerated people. All of a sudden, their voices are just as valuable as someone who can vote."¹²⁶

In terms of cost, a program like democracy vouchers that is targeted to individual Seattle residents results in a total cost that may be more predictable than that of a model like multiple matching funds, which is targeted to candidates. With democracy vouchers, since each eligible voter is given a finite dollar amount to donate, the ceiling of total costs is known. But with matching funds, a single resident could donate the cap (in New York's case, \$175) to any number of eligible candidates, making the full potential cost difficult to forecast. The distinction between policies that link incentives to individuals and those linking incentives to candidates may become particularly relevant in cities like Oakland that utilize ranked choice voting. Since ranked choice voting replaces the primary for Oakland's local elections and results in many candidates competing in the November general election, guaranteeing matching funds for all qualifying candidates could be cost prohibitive. While cities with primaries do provide funding to multiple eligible candidates during the primary campaign, the time limit inherently imposed by the primary election date (in 2017, city council primaries were held on August 1 in Seattle and September 12 in New York) limits the length of time that several candidates can receive matching donations.

In general, Miller believes that "public financing policies could support the political will to stabilize Oakland's historically diverse neighborhoods."¹²⁷ Tam Doan points out that "small donor programs can encourage candidates to spend time with and feel more accountable to residents in neighborhoods of color. Not taking large donations from a narrow donor class also means these elected officials are freed up to focus on the priorities of residents they represent" and "the more popular the program – the more it is used by the vast majority of candidates and winning candidates – the more those government bodies can govern in the public interest, and not for special interests."¹²⁸ Some are more skeptical. Dan Lindheim, who served as Oakland City Administrator from 2008-2011, is "not sure that money is really the difference that makes the difference"¹²⁹ for candidates at the city council level, asserting that campaign expenses in Oakland are low enough that public financing may not meaningfully shift incentives for candidates. Campaign finance expert Anthony Corrado counters that since public financing policies encourage "candidates or city councilmembers to come into contact with these constituents, it's not just about raising the money . . . the money is a context for engagement with the voters."¹³⁰

The low likelihood of any policy, even one that does not involve a personal financial stake in order to donate, to result in high numbers of people making political donations must be taken seriously. With public financing programs in place, only 3.8% of Seattle residents (counting cash donors and voucher donors) and 0.6% of New York residents donated to the city council and city attorney or public advocate races in 2017 (though

in the case of Seattle, this number may continue to rise as citizen awareness of the program is expected to grow after the first election cycle).¹³¹ Likewise, in Oakland, while the projected *improvement* in participation may be significant (as Heerwig and McCabe found in their Seattle research), the baseline of financial participation is so low that the impact in absolute numbers may be limited.

Recommendations

Based on quantitative and qualitative analysis and a review of the established research into how incentives for candidates and citizens operate, I recommend a robust, responsive public financing program as the most effective policy to build power in Oakland's marginalized communities. This program should replace Oakland's current campaign expenditure reimbursement program operating under the Limited Public Financing Act. When compared to campaign contribution limits and economic and electoral reform proposals, it is clear that public financing programs are the most effective, cost-efficient, politically viable, and administratively feasible policy options for Oakland. While the democracy vouchers model scored highest on this report's criteria of increasing ballots cast and donations made from the city's lowest income and most diverse city council districts, the compelling results are tempered by the novelty of the model, as there is only one election cycle from which to examine results. Further research is merited as Seattle's democracy vouchers program is expanded over future election cycles.

In order to maximize the likelihood that a public financing program meets the objectives of increasing the political influence of low-income communities and people of color, this section includes a series of implementation guidelines, outlining recommendations for community outreach and engagement, the establishment of strong eligibility standards for candidates, the targeting of benefits to communities of concern, and maximizing impact by pairing public financing with electoral reforms.

Engaging in Community Outreach

The importance of the design of the public financing program cannot be overstated. One survey respondent highlights that "the design of the system can influence the success or demise of a program,"¹³² and Tam Doan states that "a lot depends on how the public financing program is designed and whether candidates are incentivized both to use the program and to fundraise from small donors."¹³³ In order to account for Oakland's unique attributes, the program should be designed with continuous input from impacted communities in order to increase the likelihood that the policy will be successful in lowering their barriers to political participation. Beginning with the

proposal phase and continuing through the implementation stages, there should be dedicated funding for community-based multilingual education efforts to spread awareness about how public financing works and to encourage participation among both candidates and residents.

As in Seattle, the Oakland Public Ethics Commission should be able to “re-adjust parameters of the program if the numbers are too high or low to sustain.”¹³⁴ The program should also be responsive to ongoing community input and be adaptable in terms of its candidate requirements and outreach efforts.

Publicly financed candidates should be required to participate in public debates, which will be broadcast on television, radio, and online, and simulcast in Spanish, Chinese, and Vietnamese. This is the standard in place in New York City’s mayoral races for candidates accepting public financing.¹³⁵

Setting Eligibility Standards for Candidates

Oakland’s public financing program should institute robust standards for candidates to be eligible to receive public funding. However, these standards should not be so high as to discourage candidates from participating or to make enforcement impractical. The qualifying small dollar contributions the candidate is required to collect should originate from within her district to satisfy the program’s eligibility requirements. Results from Los Angeles and New York “suggest that requiring candidates to raise a significant number of qualifying contributions from within the constituency has an independent effect on the level and diversity of small donor participation.”¹³⁶ In order for Oakland’s mayoral candidates to receive public financing, the prerequisites should go a step beyond New York and Los Angeles’s programs and require a certain percentage of qualifying donors (measured by number of individuals, not dollar amount) to come from each of Oakland’s seven city council districts; this will incentivize mayoral candidates to conduct outreach across the city, not just in affluent neighborhoods. This proposal is similar to the rule imposed by the presidential campaign public financing system that requires candidates to raise money from 20 states to qualify for public funds.¹³⁷

Targeting Benefits to Communities of Concern

The program’s incentives should be accessible to all residents of Oakland, whether or not they are eligible to vote. Additionally, the benefits of public financing could be amplified by targeting incentives to Districts 5 and 7 only. This is part of the equity lens of this research: because certain groups have been persistently targeted for harm by exclusionary and discriminatory policies, explicit actions must be taken to benefit those groups. The Greenlining Institute’s Miller warns that if public financing “was implemented but without special efforts targeting those underserved communities, it could magnify existing patterns.”¹³⁸ If Oakland chooses to pursue matching funds, only

donations of \$50 and below should be matched (rather than matching the first \$50 of each donation). A proposal offered by Oakland Public Ethics Commissioner Jonathan Stein includes a “democracy bonus” that targets low-income zip codes with a higher match rate. Miller cautions that any such “bonus” should be targeted exclusively to low-income individuals, not low-income zip codes, in order to avoid rewarding relatively wealthy newcomers who have displaced longtime residents.

Pairing Public Financing with Electoral Reforms

Since the policies analyzed in this report are not mutually exclusive or exhaustive, Oakland should incorporate aspects of other proposals in order to reinforce the impact of public financing. For example, California cities Santa Rosa and Mountain View, while “stopping short of providing candidates with public campaign funds, provide other forms of subsidies to candidates who accept voluntary expenditure limits, like waiving the candidate statement fee to appear in the ballot pamphlet.”¹³⁹ Two other alternatives to significantly increase access of low-income and minority voters to the ballot box are the expansion of same-day registration and the improvement of compliance with language access laws at polling places.¹⁴⁰ The need for reform in the realm of language access is particularly well-documented, as the U.S. Department of Justice has filed two lawsuits, most recently in 2011, against Alameda County for its failure to meet Voting Rights Act requirements to provide adequate election-related materials and assistance in Chinese and Spanish.¹⁴¹

A potential opportunity to bolster a public financing program’s effectiveness could be the establishment of “vote centers” in Alameda County. In 2016, California’s state legislature passed the *California Voter’s Choice Act* to “allow counties to conduct elections under a new model which provides greater flexibility and convenience for voters.”¹⁴² In addition to automatically mailing every registered voter a ballot and expanding in-person early voting, beginning in 2018, Madera, Napa, Nevada, Sacramento, and San Mateo counties will replace traditional polling places with “vote centers.” In these counties, which opted-in to this voluntary program, voters will be able to cast ballots at any vote center within their county, a marked improvement from offering “just one polling station for just one day,” says Kimi Lee.¹⁴³ For participating counties, “starting 10 days before the Election and through the Friday before Election Day, one vote center is required for every 50,000 registered voters. On Election Day and the Saturday, Sunday, and Monday leading up to Election Day, one vote center is required for every 10,000 registered voters.”¹⁴⁴ However, the state provides no funding for this voluntary program, the model is still untested, and vote centers may be more likely to improve Oakland political participation citywide than to concentrate benefits in Districts 5 and 7. There is also a risk that replacing traditional neighborhood polling places with vote centers, projected to eliminate 85% of in-person Election Day voting sites in one county examined,¹⁴⁵ could decrease access for some communities and cause confusion; results from the five counties implementing vote centers in 2018 should be carefully evaluated to ascertain trends. Lastly, the choice to implement vote centers is

dependent on action and funding at the Alameda County level, and Oakland could not pursue these changes independently.

Conclusion

A public financing program intentionally designed with community input and supported by evidence of what works in other cities could boost political participation of low-income communities and people of color in Oakland's elections. Research indicates increased political engagement leads to greater political influence of these traditionally marginalized groups among candidates and elected officials, who gain a stronger incentive to address their priorities and concerns through policy. Policies that take the needs of these communities into account have the potential to meaningfully advance economic and racial equity in Oakland, a city where the long legacy of discrimination has reverberating repercussions that impact people on a daily basis. While the causes of political inequality are complex and the hurdles to confronting them are steep, qualitative and quantitative analysis suggests that well-designed and deliberately implemented public financing programs could break these racially-based cycles of disengagement. This shift is essential since, as articulated by Teddy Kÿ-Nam Miller, "in a democracy, political participation shouldn't be race dependent."¹⁴⁶ In order to influence policy, people have to engage in politics, and in the words of community organizer Kimi Lee, addressing whether public financing could be a tool to tackle political inequality in Oakland, "It's a start. It's a tactic. It's not going to solve our issues, but it's a first step."¹⁴⁷

Appendix A: Methodology and Limitations

Qualitative Analysis

I began this research by conducting a literature review to understand established trends concerning political influence and access, barriers to political participation, the relationship between political participation and policy outcomes, voter and donor responses to incentives in different settings, and policy levers that have been effective at changing behavior of voters and non-voters, donors and non-donors, political candidates, and elected officials. I reviewed dozens of studies and academic papers looking at these issues in local, state, federal, and international contexts. I explored several policy alternatives to increase political participation and influence among marginalized communities, including multiple matching funds, democracy vouchers, targeted tax rebates, campaign contribution limits, economic reforms, and electoral reforms. A review of the alternatives not included in the body of the report is available in Appendix B.

I completed a separate review of studies and reports focusing on the status quo in Oakland to establish the baseline of high levels of political, racial, and economic inequality, identify trends and patterns similar to what is described in the academic literature, and recognize areas in which Oakland's characteristics are unique.

I also conducted a number of interviews – in person, on the phone, and via email – with community organizers, campaign finance experts, and current and former Oakland city officials, to better understand the distinctive factors determining Oakland's political, racial, and economic landscape. The information gleaned from these conversations was supplemented by survey responses from a dozen attendees to a January 2018 meeting to discuss how public financing could be a tool for building political power in the Bay Area. The interview responses and survey results were used to develop a more comprehensive picture of the challenges and opportunities in Oakland, not to make statistically valid inferences.

Quantitative Analysis

This report's quantitative methods focused on establishing trends concerning who is voting and donating in different cities and how that is changing, and then extrapolating those results onto Oakland. Since individual data about who votes or who donates by race or socioeconomic status is not available, I identified the two city council districts – Districts 5 and 7 in East Oakland – that are the most racially diverse and have the highest poverty levels. In this analysis, Districts 5 and 7 represent Oakland's low-income, black, Latino, and Asian populations. As a proportion of their voter eligible population, they also have the lowest voter registration and turnout rates among the districts that are on the same election cycle. After analyzing voter turnout rates for Districts 5 and 7, I identified council districts in other cities that were similar to Districts 5 and 7 and analyzed their turnout rates in both citywide and statewide elections.

Instead of looking at raw numbers or percentages of turnout by district, I evaluate the *proportion* of citywide or statewide votes coming from the districts of interest. I did this to control for the difference in number of eligible voters in each district; for example, instead of comparing voters in District 7 to District 4, I compared District 7 voters to themselves over time. Even though each Oakland district has approximately 60,000

residents, in District 4, nearly everyone over 18 is eligible to vote, but in District 7, there are many more non-citizen immigrants and parolees without voting eligibility. This is why comparing districts to themselves over time is the more illustrative metric. Though data on how the number of eligible voters in these districts has shifted over time is not available, this analysis controls for any changes by comparing the turnout of voters from the same districts in citywide and statewide elections.

By analyzing votes from those districts as a proportion of citywide votes cast, I also was able to control for the variation in turnout between elections with high expected levels of engagement (like presidential cycles) and those with historically lower levels of interest, like midterm or odd-year elections.

Voting Rates - Oakland

In order to establish the baseline of political participation among Oakland's low-income residents and people of color, I analyzed voter registration and turnout data in 2012 and 2016.

Oakland districts vote every four years, with odd-numbered districts voting in 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020, etc. I choose to use the 2012 election as a baseline to measure against because of Oakland's 2010 implementation of ranked choice voting, also known as instant-runoff voting. This was a major electoral change that included among its objectives an increase in political participation. Therefore, comparing results before and after its implementation could lead to omitted variable bias. Oakland did redraw its districts in 2013 for the first time since 2003, but the redistricting only resulted in minor boundary changes that would not have significantly impacted voter turnout.

Between 2012 and 2016, District 5 votes increased by 13.3% as a share of citywide votes cast, and District 7 votes decreased by 4.2% as a share of citywide votes cast. For context, a 17.5% increase from District 5 and a 13.4% increase from District 7 would constitute proportionate representation given their respective shares of the city's citizens of voting age population (CVAP) and would fully meet the objective of increased participation. There is large variation in the direction and magnitude of the trends between Districts 5 and 7, therefore resulting in a wide range of possible future outcomes.

I relied on Alameda County Voter data and City of Oakland demographic data gleaned from the 2010 U.S. Census, the California Statewide Database, and the 2008-2012 American Community Survey to conduct this analysis.

Voting Rates - New York City and Los Angeles

For New York City, I analyzed the change in voter turnout by evaluating trends since 2005 in city council districts most similar to Oakland's Districts 5 and 7 and identifying how their proportion of the electorate changed with the 2009 increase in multiple matching rate.

To identify proxy districts, I chose to evaluate the districts that were most similar demographically and socioeconomically to Oakland's Districts 5 and 7, even though they were not the absolute poorest or most diverse districts in New York City. I identified the appropriate city council districts based on the following criteria: the district's population must be no more than 15% white and no more than 66% of any other single race, and it must have a poverty level between 25% and 35%. It must have candidates participating in the multiple matching funds program in each election cycle since 2005, and it must not have had any significant boundary changes as a result of the 2012

redistricting process. Districts 18 and 37 were the two districts that fulfilled all of these requirements. Of course, there are no perfect proxies for Oakland's Districts 5 and 7 because of distinct characteristics that are both observable and unobservable.

New York City's council districts vote every 4 years (2005, 2009, 2013, 2017, etc.). I choose to use the 2005 election as a baseline because it was the final election with the smaller 4:1 match in place. I was not able draw meaningful conclusions from changes in turnout rates from before the original matching program began in 1988 due to the many other political, economic, demographic, and social factors that have altered the electoral landscape over 30 years. In order to isolate the impact of the multiple match on Districts 18 and 37's share of citywide votes, I compared the share of votes from the same District 18 and 37 residents in the New York gubernatorial races, where no public financing exists, in an approximation of the difference-in-difference model.

The state of New York publishes voter turnout data by Assembly District for statewide elections, such as the one for governor, which take place in even years. Therefore, to ascertain voter turnout at the district level, I compared boundaries for New York city council districts with New York State Assembly districts, both before and after 2012 redistricting. Cross-referencing geographic boundaries and demographic data, I determined that Assembly Districts 54 and 76 were near-perfect fits for Council Districts 37 and 18, respectively. 2012's redistricting changed the boundaries for Assembly District 76, but Assembly District 87 adopted nearly identical boundaries. Therefore, I was able to use voting data from Assembly Districts 54, 76 (in 2002, 2006, and 2010 races) and 87 (in 2014 race) to determine how those residents voted in the Governor's race, which has no public financing, compared to the city races, which have public financing. I analyzed gubernatorial races from 2002-2014 and citywide races from 2005-2017.

This is an imperfect application of a difference-in-difference model, as limitations in data availability forced me to relax the parallel trends assumption. There is no readily accessible information about how 2001 redistricting changed the geographic boundaries for city council and State Assembly districts, so it was not possible to definitively determine whether there were parallel voter turnout trends before the increase of the multiple match in 2009.

While there were decreases in District 18 and 37 voter turnout as a proportion of citywide and statewide votes cast in most elections since 2002, the total decrease over three election cycles was 16.9% higher in state races (20.59%) than in city races (17.61%), indicating that the multiple matching funds may have mitigated an otherwise larger decrease in the citywide share of people in Districts 18 and 37 turning out to vote.

I relied on data from the New York City Campaign Finance Board, the City of New York 2012-2013 Districting Commission, the Board of Elections in the City of New York, the New York State Board of Elections, and the Center for Urban Research at the CUNY Graduate Center to conduct this analysis.

Similarly, I attempted to identify proxy districts in Los Angeles based on demographic and socioeconomic similarities, and preliminarily chose Los Angeles Districts 8, 10, 13, and 15 as being sufficiently similar districts to Oakland Districts 5 and 7. The increased match from 1:1 to 2:1 in the first-round (March) election and to 4:1 in the second-round (May) election was first implemented for odd seats in 2013 and odd seats in 2015. However, because there was extensive redistricting before the 2013 election, it was not possible to identify changes in voter participation attributable to the increased multiple match, because they could be due to significant changes in district boundaries and the related change in demographics. Therefore, instead of conducting independent analysis

for Los Angeles, I relied on Campaign Finance Institute studies evaluating the impact of the increased match on people of color and low-income people in Los Angeles citywide.

Voting Rates - Seattle

In Seattle, District 2 serves as a demographically similar proxy for Oakland Districts 5 and 7. Although substantially whiter than Oakland's Districts 5 and 7, District 2 is the only Seattle district that is less than two-thirds white. 66% of District 2's population are people of color, with half its residents speaking a language other than English at home and the highest percentage of people living in poverty of the city's districts. Again, there are no perfect proxies for Oakland's Districts 5 and 7 because of distinct characteristics that are both observable and unobservable.

2017 was the first and only citywide election with democracy vouchers in place. In order to isolate the impact of democracy vouchers on District 2's share of citywide votes, I compared the share of votes from the same District 2 residents in the Washington gubernatorial races, where no public financing exists, in an approximation of the difference-in-difference model.

2015 was the first time that Seattle voters elected geographically-based councilmembers (previously, all eight city councilmembers were at-large), so while data for the citywide 2015 election was available by council district, data from 2013 and 2017 citywide elections and 2012 and 2016 statewide elections were only available by voter precinct. Therefore, to determine the changes in the proportion of citywide votes cast from District 2 voters coinciding with the 2017 implementation of democracy vouchers, and compare that data to statewide numbers, I converted the data from voter precincts into district-based data.

Voter precinct locations in Seattle also change with every election, so I had to first establish the relationship between city council district boundaries and voter precinct locations separately for each election. For the 2017 election, this information was published, but for earlier elections, I layered the precinct locations onto a map with the Seattle city council district shapefiles included as a distinct layer. I used ArcGIS geospatial mapping software to carry out the mapping and data conversion. At that point, I converted the data from precinct level to district level. In 2012 and 2013, there were eight voter precincts that straddled multiple districts. Those with the majority of their geographic area falling within the boundaries of District 2 were coded as District 2; the others were not.

Once the precinct level data had been mapped and converted into district data, I was able to compare voter rates in District 2 as a proportion of citywide and statewide votes cast since 2012. Since citywide elections occur every two years and gubernatorial races occur every four years in Washington state, to maintain a consistent time frame, I compared changes in citywide share of votes from 2013 to 2017 and statewide share of votes from 2012 to 2016.

As with the analysis of New York City, this is an imperfect application of a difference-in-difference model, as limitations in data availability forced me to relax the parallel trends assumption. The voter precinct shapefiles are not publicly available before 2012, and therefore I was not able to analyze elections results before the 2012 election or establish parallel voter turnout trends before the 2017 implementation of democracy vouchers.

While there was an increase in District 2 voter turnout as a proportion of both citywide and statewide votes cast, the four-year increase in District 2's share of citywide turnout (8.8%) was 240% greater than the four-year increase in share of statewide turnout (3.66%). This indicates that democracy vouchers may have incentivized District 2 residents to turn out to vote at the city level.

The major limitation of this analysis is due to the innovative nature of the democracy voucher program. Since Seattle's 2017 election was the first and only globally to institute a voucher program, the model has very limited results that can be extrapolated after one election cycle.

I relied on data from the Washington Office of the Secretary of State, King County Elections, the King County Open Data portal, the King County GIS data portal, and email correspondence with the King County Elections Supervisor for GIS to conduct this analysis.

Donation Rates - Oakland

To ascertain the current rate of financial contributions from District 5 and 7 residents to political candidates, I used Oakland Public Ethics Commission data from 2016. Ideally, I would have been able to analyze the change in contribution rates from earlier election cycles. However, the Oakland Campaign Reform Act only began requiring electronic filing of contribution data in 2013, so comprehensive financial contribution data is limited to the 2014 and 2016 elections. Since Districts 5 and 7 elect their councilmembers in 2008, 2012, 2016, etc., the 2014 contribution data has limited relevance to this analysis.

Once I had the 2016 data, I refined it to include only individual contributions to the at-large council race. This is a citywide race in which, all else being equal, all city residents would have the same level of interest. Though the even-numbered districts (Districts 2, 4, and 6) did not elect their councilmembers in 2016, since it was a presidential election year, it can be assumed that their interest in the election was high.

The 2016 contribution data listed financial contributions by zip code and longitude-latitude. After eliminating the contributions originating from outside Oakland, I mapped the individual contributions onto a district map in order to determine in which council district those locations fell. I mapped the contribution data onto a layer of district-based shapefiles using ArcGIS geospatial mapping software. A limitation to this approach was the inability to confirm the source of the longitude-latitude calculations. While this analysis assumed it was based on the home addresses of individual donors, multiple inquiries to the City of Oakland data portal went unanswered, and therefore the basis of the geographic coordinates cannot be verified.

In the 2016 at-large city council race, there were 689 total donations of \$100 or more, which is Oakland's threshold for donor disclosure. Only three of those came from District 5 (0.4%), while 218 (31.6%) came from District 4. There were 14 values (approximately 2%) that were not properly geocoded in the dataset, and therefore were excluded from the analysis.

A limitation for evaluating these results is that Oakland campaign finance rules only mandate disclosure of individuals making contributions above \$100. Therefore, there is no data available for the sources of small dollar donations and their geographic origin within Oakland.

Oakland will be required to redraw its districts following the 2020 Census to ensure equal representation of its residents. If District 5 and 7's boundaries change substantially, it may be difficult to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of any given policy change. Another threat is the current trend of gentrification and displacement in Oakland, which could sufficiently change the districts' demographics as to render their status as proxies for low-income people and people of color moot. Other simultaneous changes in Oakland also threaten the validity of drawing conclusions from any changes that take place after the implementation of a new policy. However, employing a difference-in-difference model to compare municipal voting and donating rates to statewide races with previously parallel trends (but without public financing) will partially control for the impact of external factors.

I relied on Oakland Public Ethics Commission data to conduct this analysis.

Donation Rates - New York and Los Angeles

In New York City, all contributions must be reported and the identities of the donor disclosed, but in Los Angeles, only contributions above \$100 have their individual source reported. The complications inherent in the varying disclosure levels lead me to rely on research and analysis completed by the Campaign Finance Institute instead of conducting my own independent analysis. Because the Campaign Finance Institute is not analyzing financial contributions at the district level, I extrapolated their findings on increased donations from people of color and low-income people and applied those findings to Oakland's Districts 5 and 7.

One of those reports, jointly released by the Campaign Finance Institute and Brennan Center in 2012, acknowledged an important limitation in its methodology, similar to the concern I raised in relaxing the parallel trends assumption for voting rates: "Due to the absence of data from the pre-public financing era in [New York] city, we cannot know whether participation rates for city elections were ever precisely the same as they are now for state elections. A look at small donor participation under the city system in 1997—when there was a one-to-one public financing match in place—and then again in 2009, however, suggests that small donor participation rates in city elections might have looked more like participation rates now do for the state."¹⁴⁸

Donation Rates - Seattle

As with the analysis of New York City and Los Angeles, to examine changes in financial contributions from low-income people and people of color that are attributable to democracy vouchers, this analysis does not employ the proxy district method. Due to differences in thresholds for disclosing campaign contributions, limitations in the way data is collected and reported, and the fact that neighborhood-based districts were instituted for the first time in 2015 (prior to 2015, all nine districts were elected at-large), this report depends on external analysis on how the democracy voucher impacted financial contributions from low-income people and people of color citywide.

I relied on analysis conducted by the Every Voice Center and Win/Win Network, the Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission, researchers Jennifer Heerwig and Brian J. McCabe with the University of Washington Center for Studies in Demography and Ecology, and *The Seattle Times* for this information.

Appendix B: Cost Estimates

Multiple Matching Funds

Instead of estimating the annual cost of a multiple matching fund program in Oakland based on the costs in New York City and Los Angeles (which were \$38.2 million for New York's 8.4 million residents in 2013 and \$4.7 million for LA's 3.9 million residents in 2017 with a lower level match rate^{149 150}), I instead chose to base my cost calculation on Berkeley, California.

As a neighboring city to Oakland that also has ranked choice voting instead of a primary and the same number of city council races, Berkeley appears to be a more realistic starting point than New York or Los Angeles. As compared to matching the first \$175 of donations in New York City and the first \$250 of donations in Los Angeles, Berkeley will limit public matching to individual donations of \$50 and below and will not match the first \$50 of larger donations, which will be more practical for Oakland to consider given its budget limitations. While this lower level of contributions eligible for matching may decrease the magnitude of the policy's impact, candidates in Oakland, like Berkeley, face much lower spending expectations to be competitive in a city council race than do candidates in New York City or Los Angeles.

\$4.00 per Berkeley resident per year will be allocated from the General Fund to fund Berkeley's program, which is being implemented for the first time in 2018.¹⁵¹ Since Oakland and Berkeley have the same number of councilmembers and the same election structure, I estimate the annual cost to Oakland for a similar program at \$1.68 million (\$4.00 x 420,005 Oakland residents). Since this estimate is based on the budgeted cost in Berkeley, not actual costs, the cost in Oakland could be considerably lower if participation is lower than expected. This is one of many possible methods to calculate a cost estimate.

Democracy Vouchers

Since Seattle is the only city worldwide to have implemented a democracy voucher model, I based the cost estimate for Oakland on the budgeted cost for Seattle's program.

According to the City of Seattle, the \$100 Democracy Voucher program will cost the average Seattle homeowner about \$11.50 per year.¹⁵²

- Seattle has 348,117 housing units:¹⁵³ $348,117 \times \$11.50 = \$4,003,345$ total cost per year.
- 2017 population of Seattle: 713,700.¹⁵⁴ $\$4,003,345 / 713,700 = \5.61 per Seattle resident.
- 2016 population of Oakland: 420,005.¹⁵⁵ $420,005 \times \$5.61 = \$2,356,228$ projected total cost per year.

This estimate is based on the budgeted cost (not the actual cost) in Seattle and is likely at the upper end of a range of possible costs. Because the 2017 cycle in Seattle did not include the mayoral race in the democracy voucher program, it was not possible to base the estimate on actual 2017 spending.

This is one of many possible methods to calculate a cost estimate range.

Appendix C: Other Alternatives Considered

Policy: Targeted Tax Rebates: An additional policy using public financing is a targeted tax rebate for political contributions. Minnesota has a statewide tax rebate program that “allows individuals to contribute \$50 to eligible state candidates and receive a \$50 reimbursement from the state.”¹⁵⁶ Donors can immediately file paperwork to receive the refund without waiting for tax season. Former Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty failed to allocate funding to the program beginning in 2009, but in 2013, the funding was restored. To satisfy the equity criteria of this report’s analysis, this policy would have to be targeted to Oakland’s low-income residents. Tax rebates targeting District 5 and 7 residents would be an efficient way to direct incentives, and may increase voting rates, as well, since donors may be more likely to participate in other forms of political activity.

Limitations: Because there is no city-level income tax in Oakland, this is not a feasible alternative at the city level. Though it could be pursued at the state or federal level, a large percentage of this report’s targeted population earns income below the threshold legally required to file income taxes. Therefore, this policy would not change incentives for those residents, therefore limiting the effectiveness of this policy and failing to fulfill the standard of equity required by this analysis. Campaign finance expert Anthony Corrado says that “generally, programs that give rebates don’t do a whole lot. It’s just the people who typically give contributions that get rebates,” not new donors.¹⁵⁷

Policy: Block Grants: Government funded block grants to fully finance eligible candidates’ campaigns, sometimes called “clean election funds” have been employed at the state level in Maine, Connecticut, and Arizona. As with democracy vouchers and matching funds, candidates become eligible by collecting a certain number of small dollar donations from their constituents.

Limitations: While grant programs free candidates from the constraints of pursuing contributions from wealthy donors, block grants are entirely focused on supporting candidates, not on incentivizing voting or donating among previously disengaged residents. While this alternative may reform the political process, it does not build political power among marginalized communities. Additionally, block grant programs have only been tested at the state level.

Policy: Universal Basic Income (UBI): UBI is a proposal that would build economic power among low-income communities in Oakland, therefore lowering the financial barrier to making political contributions. UBI works by targeting one root cause of political inequality. This would be a less direct way for the government to incentivize political donations, since UBI recipients will face many competing priorities for their new income.

Limitations: Without complementary policies to address the other barriers to political participation (including the lack of interest in politics or distrust in the political system), the ability of this policy to increase political donations or voting rates would likely be very limited. While mainstream interest in UBI is growing as Stockton, California becomes the first U.S. city to implement a limited UBI pilot program, this is an untested policy at the municipal level and therefore lacks any evidence supporting a hypothesis

of increased political participation. Additionally, because of Oakland's size, any program that gave a meaningful amount of money to all residents would quickly become cost prohibitive.

Policy: Compulsory Voting: An electoral reform that would directly increase voting rates of the communities of interest in Oakland is compulsory voting, in which all adult citizens are required to cast ballots. At the national level, there are a number of advanced democracies that enforce compulsory voting laws, including Argentina, Australia, Belgium, and Singapore. Research on Australia's compulsory voting system, which has been in place for national elections since 1924, indicates that "when new, working class voters were brought [to] the polls Australia saw significant changes in election results and public policy."¹⁵⁸

Limitations: The radical nature of this proposal limits its current political feasibility in Oakland. Whether mandatory voting violates constitutionally protected rights is an open question among academics and policymakers, with some conservative and libertarian think tanks, including the Heritage Foundation and the Cato Institute, arguing that compulsory voting violates civil liberties by having the government force citizens to participate in the political process.¹⁵⁹ Additionally, the means by which the government forces participation raises equity concerns: any financial or legal penalty attached to non-voting will disproportionately burden low-income people.

Policy: Parolee Voting: Another electoral reform alternative is the expansion voting rights to people currently on parole. 17 states restore voting rights to formerly incarcerated people immediately upon release, while California does not restore voting rights until after parole has been served. In 2013, there were 1,055 parolees living in Oakland, with the Alameda County Probation Department noting that "East [home to Districts 5 and 7] and West Oakland have substantially higher densities of formerly incarcerated people than other parts of the county."¹⁶⁰ If all of Oakland's 1,055 parolees were concentrated in Districts 5 and 7 (which is not the case), this would represent 1.8% of the districts' voting age citizens. The expansion of voting rights to parolees is consistent with the American Civil Liberties Union's stance that "enfranchising people with criminal records is good for our communities and for our democracy."¹⁶¹

Limitations: It is highly unlikely that an expansion of voting rights to current parolees would result in any increase in their ability to donate to political candidates, because of the numerous barriers they face to employment – according to the California Research Bureau, parolees in California face an unemployment rate of 80%, and "one in 10 parolees become homeless immediately upon parole."¹⁶² The likelihood that they have disposable income is low, even if they are employed, since Oakland's cost of living is so high. Also, expanding voting rights to parolees would require an amendment to the California State Constitution and could not be pursued at the municipal level in Oakland; therefore, this alternative does not satisfy the criteria of political feasibility set forth by this analysis.

Endnotes

¹ "East and West Oakland Health Data: Existing Cumulative Health Impacts." *Alameda County Public Health Department*, September 2015, <http://www.acphd.org/media/401560/cumulative-health-impacts-east-west-oakland.pdf>.

² Kelly, Erika and Brian Watt. "Has Oakland's Fruitvale Neighborhood Ever Recovered from 'Redlining'?" *KQED*, February 9, 2018, <https://www.kqed.org/news/11648307/has-oaklands-fruitvale-neighborhood-recovered-from-redlining>.

³ Albarazi, Hannah. "New Report Finds Racial Disparities, Possible Redlining in Oakland Mortgage Lending." *The Greenlining Institute*, February 26, 2016, <http://greenlining.org/issues/2016/new-report-finds-racial-disparities-possible-redlining-in-oakland-mortgage-lending/>.

⁴ "East and West Oakland Health Data: Existing Cumulative Health Impacts."

⁵ Hedin, Mark. "Historic but toxic Oakland brick building defy attempts to level them." *East Bay Times*, April 22, 2017, <https://www.eastbaytimes.com/2017/04/22/historic-but-toxic-brick-buildings-defy-attempts-to-level-them/>.

⁶ "East and West Oakland Health Data: Existing Cumulative Health Impacts."

⁷ DeBolt, David. "Oakland police in 13th year of federal oversight." *The Mercury News*, July 13, 2016, <https://www.mercurynews.com/2016/07/13/oakland-police-in-13th-year-of-federal-oversight/>.

⁸ Hetey, Rebecca, et al. "Data for Change: A Statistical Analysis of Police Stops, Searches, Handcuffings, and Arrests in Oakland, Calif., 2013-2014." *Stanford SPARQ*, June 23, 2016, <https://stanford.app.box.com/v/Data-for-Change>.

⁹ Parker, Clifton. "Stanford big data study finds racial disparities in Oakland, Calif., police behavior, offers solutions." *Stanford News*, June 15, 2016, <https://news.stanford.edu/2016/06/15/stanford-big-data-study-finds-racial-disparities-oakland-calif-police-behavior-offers-solutions/>.

¹⁰ Voigt, Rob, et al. "Language from police body camera footage shows racial disparities in officer respect." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, June 20, 2017, <http://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/114/25/6521.full.pdf>.

¹¹ "American Fact Finder." *U.S. Census Bureau*, factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml.

¹² "GINI index (World Bank estimate)." *World Bank Group*, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI/>.

¹³ "School Ranks, School Percentiles and a Color Coded Map for the city of Oakland, CA." *California School Ratings*, 2017, <http://school-ratings.com/cities/Oakland.html>;

CrimeMapping, Accessed April 18, 2018, <https://www.crimemapping.com/map/agency/265>.

¹⁴ Graziani, Terra et al. "Counterpoints: Stories and Data for Resisting Displacement." *Anti-Eviction Mapping Project*, 2016, <http://www.antievictionmappingproject.net/alamedareport.html>;

Roshan Samara, Tony. "Race, Inequality, and the Resegregation of the Bay Area." *Urban Habitat*, November 2016, <http://urbanhabitat.org/sites/default/files/UH%20Policy%20Brief2016.pdf>;

Newberry, Laura. "Oakland's black churches struggle as African Americans leave." *San Francisco Chronicle*, January 1, 2017, <https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Oakland-s-black-churches-struggle-as-African-10828939.php>.

¹⁵ Wood, Molly. "Oakland struggles to be the anti-San Francisco." *Marketplace*, January 12, 2016, <https://www.marketplace.org/2016/01/12/wealth-poverty/oakland-struggles-be-anti-san-francisco>.

-
- ¹⁶ "Rent trend data in Oakland, California." *Rent Jungle*, March 2018, <https://www.rentjungle.com/average-rent-in-oakland-rent-trends/>.
- ¹⁷ Renzulli, Kerri Anne. "10 Most Expensive Cities to be a Center." *Time*, April 8, 2016, <http://time.com/money/4287132/most-expensive-cities-to-rent/>.
- ¹⁸ Interview with John Jones.
- ¹⁹ Interview with Teddy Kÿ-Nam Miller.
- ²⁰ Interview with John Jones.
- ²¹ Martin, Paul and Michele Claibourn. "Citizen Participation and Congressional Responsiveness: New Evidence that Participation Matters." *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, January 2013, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/lsg.12003/full>.
- ²² Griffin, John and Brian Newman. "Are Voters Better Represented?" *Journal of Politics*, 2005, http://citizensurveyproject.com/_pdfs/Are-Voters-Better-Represented_.pdf.
- ²³ Griffin, John and Brian Newman. "Are Voters Better Represented?"
- ²⁴ Barber, Michael. "Representing The Preferences of Donors, Partisans, and Voters In The U.S. Senate," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 2016, http://static1.squarespace.com/static/51841c73e4b04fc5ce6e8f15/t/56e97017b09f951532074016/1458139160759/POQ_Early_Access.pdf.
- ²⁵ Rhodes, Jesse and Brian Schaffner. "Economic Inequality and Representation in the U.S. House: A New Approach Using Population-Level Data." April 7, 2013, <http://people.umass.edu/schaffne/Schaffner.Rhodes.MPSA.2013.pdf>.
- Canes-Wrone, Brandice and Nathan Gibson. "Senators' Responsiveness to Donors versus Voters." *Prepared for SSRC Anxieties in Democracy Conference, Princeton University*, October 2016, <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/78e5/a7bb68ce7901a647aeb5d1bbc988e8043b65.pdf>.
- ²⁶ Gilens, Martin. "Under the Influence." *Boston Review*, July/August 2012, http://bostonreview.net/archives/BR37.4/ndf_martin_gilens_money_politics_democracy.php.
- ²⁷ "Oakland Council Districts Demographic Profile." *City of Oakland, California*, September 26, 2014, <http://www2.oaklandnet.com/oakcal/groups/ceda/documents/report/oak049456.pdf>.
- ²⁸ *CrimeMapping*.
- ²⁹ "Oakland Council Districts Demographic Profile."
- ³⁰ As of May 1, 2018, there were 44,314 registered voters in District 1 and 22,847 registered voters in District 5. "Alameda County Voter Registration." *Alameda County, CA*, May 1, 2018, http://www.acgov.org/rov_app/edata/.
- ³¹ "Oakland Council Districts Demographic Profile."; "Alameda County Voter Registration."; "General Election (Certified Results) - November 08, 2016." *Official Election Site of Alameda County*, http://www.acgov.org/rov/current_election/230/index.htm.
- ³² Callahan, David and J. Mijin Cha. "Stacked Deck: How the Dominance of Politics by the Affluent & Business Undermines Economic Mobility in America." *Demos*, February 2013, <http://www.demos.org/stacked-deck-how-dominance-politics-affluent-business-undermines-economic-mobility-america>.
- ³³ "Public Portal for Campaign Finance and Lobbyist Disclosure." *Oakland Public Ethics Commission*, <https://public.netfile.com/pub2/Default.aspx?aid=COAK>.
- ³⁴ Interview with Teddy Kÿ-Nam Miller.
- ³⁵ "2017 City of Oakland Budget Priorities Survey - Summary Report." *Fairbank, Maslin, Maullin, Metz and Associates - Public Opinion Research and Strategy*, conducted January 3-12, 2017.
- ³⁶ "2017 City of Oakland Budget Priorities Survey." *Fairbank, Maslin, Maullin, Metz and Associates - Public Opinion Research and Strategy*, conducted January 3-12, 2017,

<http://www2.oaklandnet.com/oakcal/groups/cityadministrator/documents/agenda/oak062970.pdf>.

³⁷ "2017 City of Oakland Budget Priorities Survey."

³⁸ Interview with Councilmember Annie Campbell Washington.

³⁹ Malbin, Michael and Michael Parrott. "Small Donor Empowerment Depends on the Details: Comparing Matching Fund Programs in New York and Los Angeles." *The Forum*, July 2017, http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/testimony/NYCCFB%20Testimony_Malbin_29Jan2018_revised_with-Appendix.pdf.

⁴⁰ Interview with Kimi Lee.

⁴¹ "School Ranks, School Percentiles and a Color Coded Map for the city of Oakland, CA." *California School Ratings*, 2017, <http://school-ratings.com/cities/Oakland.html>;

⁴² "School Ranks, School Percentiles and a Color Coded Map for the city of Oakland, CA."

⁴³ Interview with Councilmember Annie Campbell Washington.

⁴⁴ Interview with Kimi Lee.

⁴⁵ Fraga, Bernard. "Candidates or Districts? Reevaluating the Role of Race in Voter Turnout." *American Journal of Political Science*, January 2016, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12172/abstract>.

⁴⁶ Callahan, David and J. Mijin Cha. "Stacked Deck: How the Dominance of Politics by the Affluent & Business Undermines Economic Mobility in America."

⁴⁷ Rhodes, Jesse and Brian Schaffner. "Economic Inequality and Representation in the U.S. House: A New Approach Using Population-Level Data."

⁴⁸ Interview with Anthony Corrado.

⁴⁹ "Limits and Thresholds." *New York City Campaign Finance Board*, <http://www.nyccfb.info/candidate-services/limits-thresholds/2017/>.

⁵⁰ All candidates for New York City municipal office can participate in the matching funds program and face different qualifying criteria. For more details about how candidates seek office other than city council qualify, see: "How it Works." *New York City Campaign Finance Board*, <http://www.nyccfb.info/program/how-it-works>.

⁵¹ "Eligibility and other requirements." *New York City Campaign Finance Board*, <http://www.nyccfb.info/law/act/eligibility-and-other-requirements/>.

⁵² "How it Works." *New York City Campaign Finance Board*.

⁵³ "Census Demographics at the NYC City Council district (CNCLD) level." *Data.gov*, January 28, 2016, <https://catalog.data.gov/dataset/census-demographics-at-the-nyc-city-council-district-cncl-d-level/resource/c28a5858-9709-4e78-90e1-cd142dbff99c>.

⁵⁴ "Poverty in New York City Council Districts." *Institute for Children, Poverty, and Homelessness*, April 2016, <http://www.icphusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Poverty.pdf>.

⁵⁵ Methodology is available in Appendix A.

⁵⁶ Methodology is available in Appendix A.

⁵⁷ Migally, Angela and Susan Liss. "Small Donor Matching Funds: The NYC Election Experience." *Brennan Center for Justice*, 2010, <http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Small%20Donor%20Matching%20Funds-The%20NYC%20Election%20Experience.pdf>.

⁵⁸ Genn, Elizabeth, Michael Malbin, Sundee Iyer, and Brendan Glavin. "Donor Diversity through Public Matching Funds." *Brennan Center for Justice and the Campaign Finance Institute*, 2012, <http://cfinst.org/pdf/state/ny/DonorDiversity.pdf>.

⁵⁹ Lioz, Adam. "Stacked Deck: How the Racial Bias in our Big Money Political System Undermines our Democracy and our Economy." *Demos*, December 2014, <http://www.demos.org/publication/stacked-deck-how-bias-our-big-money-political-system-undermines-racial-equity>.

⁶⁰ Genn, Elizabeth, et al. "Donor Diversity through Public Matching Funds."

⁶¹ Malbin, Michael, Peter Brusoe, and Brendan Glavin. "Small Donors, Big Democracy: New York City's Matching Funds as a Model for the Nation and States." *Election Law Journal*, 2012, <http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/state/NYC-as-a-Model-ELJ-As-Published-March2012.pdf>.

⁶² Malbin, Michael. "Testimony on Public Financing in the Election of 2017." *The Campaign Finance Institute*, January 29, 2018, <http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/testimony/NYCCFB%20Testimony-Malbin-29Jan2018-revised-with-Appendix.pdf>.

⁶³ Genn, Elizabeth, et al. "Donor Diversity through Public Matching Funds."

⁶⁴ Genn, Elizabeth, et al. "Donor Diversity through Public Matching Funds."

⁶⁵ Malbin, Michael, Peter Brusoe, and Brendan Glavin. "Small Donors, Big Democracy: New York City's Matching Funds as a Model for the Nation and States."

⁶⁶ Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC, et al. v. Bennett, et al, 564 U.S. 721 (2011). <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/564/721/opinion.html>.

⁶⁷ Malbin, Michael. "Small Donor Percentage Dropped in NYC, Raising 'Warning Flags' about a System that 'Set the Standard.'" *The Campaign Finance Institute*, January 29, 2018, <http://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/18-01-29/CFI%E2%80%99s-Testimony-to-the-New-York-City-Campaign-Finance-Board-on-Small-Donor-Matching-Funds-in-2017.aspx>.

⁶⁸ Malbin, Michael. "Testimony on Public Financing in the Election of 2017."

⁶⁹ Email correspondence with Michael Malbin.

⁷⁰ Malbin, Michael and Michael Parrott. "Small Donor Empowerment Depends on the Details: Comparing Matching Fund Programs in New York and Los Angeles."

⁷¹ Malbin, Michael and Michael Parrott. "Would Revising Los Angeles' Campaign Matching Fund System Make a Difference?" *Campaign Finance Institute*, September 2016, <http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/books-reports/LosAngeles-PublicFundingReport-2016.pdf>.

⁷² "Geographic Terms and Concept - Block Groups." *U.S. Census Bureau*, <https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/qtc/qtc-bg.html>.

⁷³ Malbin, Michael and Michael Parrott. "Would Revising Los Angeles' Campaign Matching Fund System Make a Difference?"

⁷⁴ These numbers are for the two 2017 city council races, which were both at-large. Qualifying numbers for future elections will vary as district-based city council races will involve different thresholds.

⁷⁵ Carlsen, Audrey. "Seattle's City Council Districts." *The Seattle Times*, 2015, <http://projects.seattletimes.com/2015/city-council-districts/>;

McDermott, Kara. "Get to Know Your New Seattle City Council District." *KUOW*, August 21, 2015, <http://kuow.org/post/get-know-your-new-seattle-city-council-district>.

⁷⁶ Carlsen, Audrey. "Seattle's City Council Districts." *The Seattle Times*, 2015, <http://projects.seattletimes.com/2015/city-council-districts/>.

⁷⁷ Although geographic-based city council districts were employed for the first time in 2015, I was able to use GIS to map the districts to the relevant voter precincts for the 2012 and 2013 elections in order to ascertain turnout from the neighborhoods currently contained by District 2. A full explanation of the methodology used is available in Appendix A.

⁷⁸ Heerwig, Jennifer and Brian J. McCabe. "Expanding Participation in Municipal Elections: Assessing the Impact on Seattle's Democracy Voucher Program." *University of Washington Center for Studies in Demography and Ecology*, 2018.

⁷⁹ "Democracy Voucher Program: Participation by City Council District." *Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission*, January 2018, <http://www.seattle.gov/democracyvoucher/program-data/participation-by-district>.

⁸⁰ Friedenbach, Laura. "Seattle's Democracy Vouchers Reduce the Power of Big Money and Expand Political Participation." *Every Voice*, November 15, 2017, <http://www.everyvoice.org/press-release/report-seattle-democracy-vouchers-success>.

⁸¹ "2017 - Past Participating Candidates." *Seattle Democracy Voucher Program*, 2018, <https://www.seattle.gov/democracyvoucher/i-am-a-seattle-resident/past-participating-candidates>.

⁸² From Every Voice: "For analyses based on age and sex, individuals were matched in Catalist to voter file data, sourced from the Washington Secretary of State. For analyses based on race and income, individuals were geocoded to Census block groups and the demographic information available for their neighborhoods."

⁸³ "First Look: Seattle's Democracy Voucher Program." *Every Voice Center and Win/Win Network*, November 15, 2017, <http://honestelectionsseattle.org/2017-report/>.

⁸⁴ Heerwig, Jennifer and Brian J. McCabe. "Expanding Participation in Municipal Elections: Assessing the Impact on Seattle's Democracy Voucher Program."

⁸⁵ Heerwig, Jennifer and Brian J. McCabe. "Expanding Participation in Municipal Elections: Assessing the Impact on Seattle's Democracy Voucher Program."

⁸⁶ "First Look: Seattle's Democracy Voucher Program."

⁸⁷ "First Look: Seattle's Democracy Voucher Program."

⁸⁸ Interview with Tam Doan.

⁸⁹ Fein, Ron. "The Impact of Seattle's Democracy Voucher Program on Candidates' Ability to Rely on Constituents for Fundraising." *Free Speech for People*, May 2018, https://freespeechforpeople.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/FSFP-Issue-Report-2018_1.pdf.

⁹⁰ Kotch, Alex. "Can Public Campaign Finance Systems Empower Small Donors?" *IB Times*, October 25, 2017, <http://www.ibtimes.com/political-capital/can-public-campaign-finance-systems-empower-small-donors-2606173>.

⁹¹ Cohen, Josh. "Democracy vouchers' aim to amplify low-income voices, to conservative ire." *The Guardian*, July 7, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jul/07/democracy-vouchers-seattle-politics-low-income-homeless>.

⁹² Interview with Anthony Corrado.

⁹³ "First Look: Seattle's Democracy Voucher Program."

⁹⁴ "November 3, 2015 General and Special Election." *King County Elections*, <http://your.kingcounty.gov/elections2/contests/measureinfo.aspx?cid=54519&eid=1266>.

⁹⁵ "Seattle Foundation and King County Elections announce Voter Education Fund grants." *Seattle Foundation*, June 9, 2017, <https://www.seattlefoundation.org/Blog/Articles/2017/07/VEF-awards>.

⁹⁶ "The Voter Education Fund." *Seattle Foundation*, April 13, 2017, <https://www.seattlefoundation.org/Blog/Articles/2017/05/Voter-Education-Fund>.

⁹⁷ "Charts - City Attorney." *Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission*, May 6, 2018, <http://web6.seattle.gov/ethics/elections/charts.aspx?cycle=2017&n1=contributions&n2=type&n3=candidates&n4=cityattorney&n5=campaign555&n6=amount#aChartTop>.

⁹⁸ Green, Sara Jean. "Seattle City Attorney Pete Holmes cruises to re-election over Scott Lindsay." *The Seattle Times*, November 7, 2017, <https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/seattle-city-attorney-pete-holmes-scott-lindsay/>.

⁹⁹ "November 3, 2015 General and Special Election."

¹⁰⁰ Berman, Russell. "Seattle's Experiment with Campaign Funding." *The Atlantic*, November 10, 2015, <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/seattle-experiments-with-campaign-funding/415026/>.

¹⁰¹ Heerwig, Jennifer and Brian J. McCabe. "Expanding Participation in Municipal Elections: Assessing the Impact on Seattle's Democracy Voucher Program."

¹⁰² "QuickFacts: Seattle City, Washington; United States." *U.S. Census Bureau*, 2016, <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/seattlecitywashington,US/PST045216>.

¹⁰³ "First Look: Seattle's Democracy Voucher Program."

¹⁰⁴ McElwee, Sean. "Whose Voice, Whose Choice? The Distorting Influence of the Political Donor Class in our Big-Money Elections." *Demos*, 2016, http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/Whose%20Voice%20Whose%20Choice_2.pdf.

¹⁰⁵ These numbers are current as of March 2016. Heidorn, Nicolas. "California Common Cause Report: Local Campaign Contribution Limits." *California Common Cause*, March 2016, <http://www.commoncause.org/states/california/research-and-reports/local-campaign-contribution-limits.pdf>.

¹⁰⁶ "Campaign Rules for Candidates and Committees." *City of Oakland - Public Ethics Commission*, <http://www2.oaklandnet.com/government/o/CityAdministration/d/PublicEthics/o/Candidates/index.htm>.

¹⁰⁷ "Oakland Campaign Reform Act Guide." *City of Oakland Public Ethics Commission*, 2018, <http://www2.oaklandnet.com/oakcal/groups/cityadministrator/documents/report/oak068237.pdf>.

¹⁰⁸ Heidorn, Nicolas. "California Common Cause Report: Local Campaign Contribution Limits."

¹⁰⁹ Analysis by Jonathan Stein, Chair of the Oakland Public Ethics Commission Subcommittee on Campaign Finance.

¹¹⁰ Thy, Vo. "Big Donors Can Dominate City Election Spending - Whether or Not There are Contribution Limits." *Voice of OC*, January 9, 2018, <https://voiceofoc.org/2018/01/big-donors-can-dominate-city-election-spending-whether-or-not-there-are-contribution-limits/>.

¹¹¹ Thy, Vo. "Big Donors Can Dominate City Election Spending - Whether or Not There are Contribution Limits."

¹¹² "November 3, 2015 General and Special Election."

¹¹³ "Local Candidates, Superior Court Judges, Their Controlled Committees, and Primarily Formed Committees for Local Candidates." *California Fair Practices Commission*, April 2016, http://www.fppc.ca.gov/content/dam/fppc/NS-Documents/TAD/Campaign%20Manuals/Manual_2/Final_Manual_2_Entire_Manual.pdf.

¹¹⁴ Curlin, Laura. "MapLight Analysis Finds Small Group of Donors Responsible for Oakland Campaign Money." *MapLight*, February 20, 2018, <https://maplight.org/story/maplight-analysis-finds-small-group-of-donors-responsible-for-oakland-campaign-money/>.

¹¹⁵ Interview with anonymous Oakland resident.

¹¹⁶ Ledewitz, Bruce. "The Threat of Independent Political Spending to Democratic Life – and a Plan to Stop It." *Cleveland State Law Review*, 2016, <https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3900&context=clevstlrev>.

¹¹⁷ Miller, Jim. "Independent spending in California's statewide, legislative races the highest in decades." *The Sacramento Bee*, June 1, 2014, <http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/election/article2600258.html>.

¹¹⁸ "Chapter 3.13 - Limited Public Financing Act." *Oakland City Charter*, https://library.municode.com/ca/oakland/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=TIT3MUEL_CH3.13LIPUFAC.

¹¹⁹ Roberts, Brenda. "Performance Audit: Limited Public Financing Act: 2016 Election Year." *Office of the City Auditor*, December 14, 2017, <http://www.oaklandauditor.com/images/oakland/auditreports/lpfa%202016%20election%20audit%20report.pdf>.

¹²⁰ Roshan Samara, Tony. "Race, Inequality, and the Resegregation of the Bay Area.;" "City of Oakland." *Bay Area Census*, <http://www.bayareacensus.ca.gov/cities/Oakland.htm>.

¹²¹ Interview with John Jones.

¹²² Interview with John Jones.

¹²³ Interview with Teddy Kÿ-Nam Miller.

¹²⁴ Survey responses, January 31, 2018 - February 9, 2018.

¹²⁵ Interview with Kimi Lee.

¹²⁶ Interview with Councilmember Annie Campbell Washington.

¹²⁷ Interview with Teddy Kÿ-Nam Miller.

¹²⁸ Interview with Tam Doan.

¹²⁹ Interview with Dan Lindheim.

¹³⁰ Interview with Anthony Corrado.

¹³¹ Analysis based on: "Charts." *Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission*, May 6, 2018, <http://web6.seattle.gov/ethics/elections/charts.aspx?cycle=2017&n1=contributions&n2=total&n3=groupings&n4=allcontests&n5=contest155&n6=number#aChartTop>;

"QuickFacts: Seattle city, Washington; United States.;"

"Data library." *New York City Campaign Finance Board*, March 20, 2018;

"QuickFacts: New York city, New York; United States." *U.S. Census Bureau*, 2016, <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/newyorkcitynewyork/PST045216>.

¹³² Survey responses, January 31, 2018 - February 9, 2018.

¹³³ Interview with Tam Doan.

¹³⁴ Durning, Alan. "Seattle Government, meet Democracy Vouchers." *Sightline Institute*, April 28, 2015, <http://www.sightline.org/2015/04/28/seattle-government-meet-democracy-vouchers/>.

¹³⁵ "2013 Post-Election Report." *New York City Campaign Finance Board*, 2014, https://www.nycffb.info/sites/default/files/pressfiles/2013_PER.pdf.

¹³⁶ Malbin, Michael and Michael Parrott. "Small Donor Empowerment Depends on the Details: Comparing Matching Fund Programs in New York and Los Angeles."

¹³⁷ Garrett, Sam R. "Public Financing of Presidential Campaigns: Overview and Analysis." *Congressional Research Service*, January 29, 2014, <https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL34534.html>.

¹³⁸ Interview with Teddy Kÿ-Nam Miller.

¹³⁹ Heidorn, Nicolas. "California Municipal Democracy Index 2016." *California Common Cause*, December 2016, <http://www.commoncause.org/states/california/research-and-reports/california-municipal.pdf>.

-
- ¹⁴⁰ *Asian Americans Advancing Justice* issued a report in 2017 on the state of language access in California's elections that includes comprehensive recommendations for improving the status quo. "Voices of Democracy: The State of Language Access in California's November 2016 Elections." *Asian Americans Advancing Justice*, 2017, https://www.advancingjustice-alc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/05042017_AJ_State_of_Language_Report_DIGITAL_FINAL.pdf.
- ¹⁴¹ "United States of America v. Alameda County, California." *U.S. Department of Justice*, June 30, 2011, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/07/06/alameda_comp11.pdf.
- ¹⁴² "California Voter's Choice Act." *California Secretary of State*, <http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voters-choice-act/>.
- ¹⁴³ Interview with Kimi Lee.
- ¹⁴⁴ "About California Voter's Choice Act." *California Secretary of State*, <http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voters-choice-act/about-vca/>.
- ¹⁴⁵ "California Voter's Choice Act: Implementation in Sacramento County." *Voter's Choice California*, September 19, 2017, <https://pocketgreenhaven.files.wordpress.com/2017/09/vca-sacramento-presentation.pdf>.
- ¹⁴⁶ Interview with Teddy Kÿ-Nam Miller.
- ¹⁴⁷ Interview with Kimi Lee.
- ¹⁴⁸ Genn, Elizabeth, et al. "Donor Diversity through Public Matching Funds."
- ¹⁴⁹ The LA figure does not account for the cost of administering the program.
- ¹⁵⁰ Malbin, Michael and Michael Parrott: "Small Donor Empowerment Depends on the Details: Comparing Matching Fund Programs in New York and Los Angeles."
- ¹⁵¹ "City of Berkeley Measure X1." *November 8, 2016 Ballot Measures*, 2016, <https://www.cityofberkeley.info/uploadedFiles/Clerk/Elections/Ballot%20Measures%20-%20November%202016.pdf>.
- ¹⁵² "Democracy Voucher Program." *Seattle Democracy Voucher Program*, <https://www.seattle.gov/democracypoucher/about-the-program>.
- ¹⁵³ "Housing Quick Statistics." *Seattle Office of Planning and Community Development*, 2017, <https://www.seattle.gov/opcd/population-and-demographics/about-seattle#housing>.
- ¹⁵⁴ "Population and Demographics." *Seattle Office of Planning and Community Development*, 2017, <https://www.seattle.gov/opcd/population-and-demographics>.
- ¹⁵⁵ "QuickFacts: Oakland city, California." *U.S. Census Bureau*, 2016, <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/oaklandcitycalifornia/PST045216>.
- ¹⁵⁶ "Political Contribution Refund Program Returns." *Minnesota Association of Professional Employees*, June 11, 2013, <https://www.mape.org/team-mape/news/political-contribution-refund-program-returns>.
- ¹⁵⁷ Interview with Anthony Corrado.
- ¹⁵⁸ Fowler, Anthony George. "Five Studies on the Causes and Consequences of Voter Turnout." *Harvard University*, 2013, https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/11156810/Fowler_gsas.harvard_0084L_10773.pdf?sequence=1.
- ¹⁵⁹ Woodruff, Betsy. "Obama Floats the Idea of Mandatory Voting. The Right Pushes Back." *Slate*, March 19, 2015, http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/03/19/obama_suggests_mandatory_voting_marco_rubio_and_conservative_wonks_push.html.
- ¹⁶⁰ Crosby, Neola. "Alameda County Adult Re-Entry Strategic Plan." *Alameda County Probation Department*, March 11, 2014, <https://www.acgov.org/probation/documents/ReEntryStrategicPlan-BoardApproved3-11-14.pdf>.
- ¹⁶¹ Kief, Nicole. "Voting with a Criminal Record." *American Civil Liberties Union*, October 2008,

<https://www.aclu.org/other/voting-criminal-record-how-registration-forms-frustrate-democracy?redirect=credirect/36998>.

¹⁶² Daza, Roberto. "Jobs scarce for released inmates, Oakland's working poor." *Oakland North*, October 14, 2010, <https://oaklandnorth.net/2010/10/14/jobs-scarce-for-released-inmates-oaklands-working-poor/>.